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Under what conditions will the People’s Republic of China and Indonesia be more 
likely to enter into an armed conflict over disputes in the South China Sea? The purpose 
of this thesis is to determine the conditions under which both countries might enter into 
an armed conflict. As no recent armed conflict has involved both countries, this thesis 
limits its analysis to the historical background and current foreign policy trends of the 
People’s Republic of China and Indonesia.  
Historical cases of China and Indonesia are analyzed to determine how both 
countries behaved when dealing with situations similar to the maritime dispute in the 
South China Sea. The results of the historical analysis are then examined within the 
context of each state’s foreign policy toward the other on the South China Sea issue. The 
thesis uses the refined analysis to predict the possibility of armed conflict between the 
two countries in the near future. Further, it examines policy implications and makes 
foreign policy recommendations for the government of Indonesia. 
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The lack of clarity on the coordinates of the Nine-Dash Line may potentially 
affect Indonesia’s claims of sovereignty over Natuna Island and over the exclusive 
economic zone around Natuna Island. China has maintained its stand that Chinese 
fisherman should be allowed to use traditional fishing areas near Natuna Island while 
Indonesia maintains its rights over the natural resources within its exclusive economic 
zone. This ambiguity has caused several incidents within this area, the latest of which 
involved China’s Coast Guard preventing an Indonesian Navy ship from arresting the 
crew of a Chinese fishing boat off Natuna Island. 
A. RECENT CLASHES AT THE NATUNA ISLANDS 
In 2016, there were three incidents between Indonesia and China regarding rights 
in the South China Sea. The first incident took place on March 19, when Indonesian 
authorities stopped a Chinese fishing vessel and arrested its crew.1 The second incident 
occurred on May 27, when an Indonesian Navy ship fired on a Chinese fishing vessel 
forcing it to stop and then arrested the crew.2 The third incident happened on June 17, 
when the Indonesian Navy fired on another Chinese fishing vessel.3  
The responses from both countries were quite firm and bold. Following the first 
incident, the Indonesian foreign minister called the Chinese ambassador for clarification 
concerning the clear incursions into Indonesian fishing areas.4 On the Chinese side, 
authorities demanded the release of the crews and maintained its authority to operate in 
the region.5 Following the third occurrence, Chinese authorities held a press conference 
                                                 
1 Onat Kibroglu, “Indonesia’s Territorial Dispute in the South China Sea,” RICHTOPIA (blog), 
October 22, 2016, accessed October 2, 2017, https://richtopia.com/global-economics/indonesia-territorial-
dispute-south-china-sea.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid.  
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stating that Indonesia should stop its actions or risk raising tensions.6 As a reaction, the 
Indonesian government sent a strong signal to China. The Indonesian president visited 
Natuna, on an Indonesian navy ship, and emphasized that the Natuna islands belong to 
Indonesia. Even though both states responded strongly to this set of incidents, both 
countries were still attempting to avoid escalation. Clearly, this set of incidents was not 
enough to escalate the situation into an armed conflict between China and Indonesia.  
B. PURPOSE  
Both China’s and Indonesia’s naval ships have had close encounters over fishing 
boats in this traditional fishing area, and it may only be a matter of time before such an 
incident escalates into serious armed conflict.7 Hence, the purpose of this thesis is to 
understand the conditions that could drive both countries into an armed conflict. For the 
purposes of this research effort, we define armed conflict, based on Melvin Small and J. 
David Singer’s definition of war, as the occasion when continual conflict by organized 
armed forces results in direct casualties of at least 1,000 within any particular year.8 
Since there have been no recent armed conflicts between China and Indonesia, 
this thesis analyzes several relevant case studies. These case studies provide the historical 
background and identify current trends in the foreign policy of the People’s Republic of 
China and Indonesia to answer our central research question: under what conditions 
would the People’s Republic of China and Indonesia be more likely to enter an armed 
conflict over disputes in the South China Sea in the near future? 
                                                 
6 Kibroglu, “Indonesia’s Territorial Dispute in the South China Sea.”  
7 Keith Johnson, “Can Indonesia Afford a Fish War with China?” Foreign Policy, July 8, 2016, 
accessed March 14, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/08/can-indonesia-afford-a-fish-war-with-
china/.  
8 Meredith Reid Sarkees, “The COW Typology of War: Defining and Categorizing Wars (Version 4 of 
the data),” Semantic Scholar, 1–2, 2010, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9455/
5463d133d56cec19e8ea56ab1d3d2efbca97.pdf.  
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C. FACTORS LEADING TO WAR 
1. Escalation Model 
Based on existing theories of conflict, we can divide the escalation of conflict into 
several stages.9 Here, we use Eric Brahm’s model,10 which separates conflict into nine 
stages: no conflict, latent conflict, emergence, escalation, stalemate, de-escalation, 
settlement, post-conflict, and the last stage, peace and reconciliation.11 For the purpose of 
this thesis, we focus on only three out of nine stages in Brahm’s model, which are latent 
conflict, emergence, and escalation.12  
According to Brahm, latent conflict “exists whenever individuals, groups, 
organizations, or nations have differences that bother one or the other, but those 
differences are not great enough to cause one side to act to alter the situation.”13 China 
and Indonesia clearly have differences in defining and interpreting the South China Sea 
boundaries and fishing rights.  
In terms of the emergence stage, Brahm states that a “triggering event marks the 
emergence or the eruption phase of the conflict. This event or episode may be the first 
appearance of the conflict.”14 The initiation of this stage requires a triggering event in the 
dispute between China and Indonesia. Any one of the incidents in 2016 represents a 
triggering event and provides evidence that China and Indonesia are currently in the 
emergence stage of conflict. Nevertheless, violence, in the sense of war or armed conflict, 
has not yet occurred. So far, those trigger events have been insufficient to move 
Indonesia and China into open armed conflict.  
                                                 
9 Some of those authors are Glasl, Noll, Cornelius et al., Hocker and Wilmot, and Brahm. 
10 Eric Brahm, “Conflict Stages: Beyond Intractability,” Conflict Research Consortium, 2003,  
https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/conflict_stages.  
11 Ibid. 
12 Brahm’s model can be used in the context of conflict between countries. Different types of conflict 
will require different models. See: Jens Allwood and Elisabeth Ahlsén. “On Stages of Conflict Escalation,” 
in Conflict and Multimodal Communication, 53–69 (Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2015), 
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-14081-0_3  
13 Brahm, Conflict Stages: Beyond Intractability.  
14 Ibid. 
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According to Brahm,  
Escalation refers to an increase in the intensity of a conflict and in the 
severity of tactics used in pursuing it. It is driven by changes within each 
of the parties, new patterns of interaction between them, and the 
involvement of new parties in the struggle. When conflicts escalate, more 
people tend to become involved. Parties begin to make bigger and stronger 
threats and impose harsher negative sanctions. Violence may start, or if 
violence has already occurred, it may become more severe and/or 
widespread as the number of participants involved in the conflict 
increases, and a greater proportion of a state’s citizens actively engage in 
fighting.15 
In the escalation stage, violence or an armed conflict begins. In the next 
subsection, we argue that in the context of the dispute between China and Indonesia, both 
countries could step into this stage, particularly if there were changes caused by domestic 
politics within one or both of those countries. Nationalism coupled with additional 
triggering events in the emergence stage could be sufficient to move China and Indonesia 
into the escalation stage.  
2. Nationalism 
We define nationalism here based on Merriam-Webster: “as a loyalty and 
devotion to a nation; especially: a sense of national consciousness, exalting one nation 
above all others and placing primary emphasis on promotion of its culture and interests as 
opposed to those of other nations or supranational groups. Intense nationalism was one of 
the causes of the war.”16 In Chapter III we discuss in detail how nationalism makes the 
South China Sea a sensitive issue for both countries.  
As previously noted, this thesis intends to examine the conditions that may cause 
a war between China and Indonesia. We propose that the likelihood of transitioning from 
the emergence to escalation stage is tied to nationalism and that longstanding rivalries 
between states create more fertile ground for the mobilization of nationalism and the 
potential of escalation. 
                                                 
15 Brahm, Conflict Stages: Beyond Intractability.  
16 Merriam-Webster, s.v. “nationalism,” accessed October 19, 2017, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/nationalism.  
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3. Enduring Rivalry 
We define enduring rivalry here based on Paul R. Hensel’s definition: “actors 
whose relations are characterized by disagreement or competition over some stakes that 
are viewed as important, where each perceives that the other poses a significant security 
threat, and where this competition and threat perception last for substantial periods of 
time.”17 According to Sarah McLaughlin Mitchell and Brandon C. Prins, countries that 
have longstanding rivalries could easily plunge into a war when domestic instability 
exists.18 This enduring rivalry may create a political environment that state leaders can 
use to promote intense nationalism against an international rival. In the context of the 
maritime dispute between China and Indonesia over the disputed areas around the Natuna 
Islands, we subsequently argue that the absence of an enduring rivalry in this case 
decreases the possibility that the dispute will escalate into a war. 
D. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter I provides the general overview 
of the thesis, theoretical foundations, as well as background on the South China Sea 
dispute between Indonesia and China. Chapter I also includes a review of the scholarly 
literature on the importance of the South China Sea, the tendency for regime to gain 
support by mobilizing citizenry to “rally ′round the flag,” and the methods by which both 
China and Indonesia have solved other territorial disputes. Chapter II discusses how both 
countries have behaved in past territorial disputes. Chapter III addresses nationalism in 
the context of the dispute for both countries. Chapter IV examines the current trends of 
Chinese foreign policy toward Indonesia. Chapter V examines the current trends of the 
Indonesian foreign policy toward China. Chapter VI presents analysis and conclusions, 
summarizes all of the chapters, and synthesizes policy implications and recommendations 
for Indonesia. 
                                                 
17 Paul R. Hensel, “Interstate Rivalry and The Study of Militarized Conflict,” New Directions in the 
Study of International Conflict, Crises, and War (1998): 166. 
18 Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Brandon C. Prins, “Rivalry and Diversionary Uses of Force,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 6 (2004): 938, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/
0022002704269354. 
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E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section reviews the literature on three topics that are important to the thesis: 
(1) the importance of the South China Sea; (2) the tendency for rallying ′round the flag by 
both nations; and (3) the tendency for both states to solve the dispute by force. 
1. The Importance of the South China Sea  
Territorial disputes, a topic that attracts many scholars’ attention in political 
science, are one of the primary reasons for a state to wage a war with another state.19 
Classical theories try to explain why territorial disputes could ignite a war. Wright, in 
1932, discusses that disputes over land and resources as one of the reason for war. Hensel 
and Mitchell, in 2006, try to refute Wright’s claim by proposing the theory of issue 
indivisibility as an alternative explanation of why states wage war over disputed 
territories.20 They argue that territorial disputes can be driven by tangible and intangible 
factors.21 It would be easy to resolve a territorial dispute driven by a tangible factors, but 
solving a territorial dispute that is rooted in intangible factors, such as historical 
possessions, important homelands, sacred sites, and identity ties, is not an easy task.22  
Many scholars and pundits discuss the importance of the South China Sea, from 
the perspective of China or from that of Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia.23 
The question of what factors contribute to the sea’s importance can shed light on what 
contributes to the maritime disputes and why they might escalate into armed conflict. 
Natural resources, for example, are a common factor that many experts believe makes the 
                                                 
19 The dispute between China and Indonesia is not a territorial dispute at all, but most likely a right to 
sovereign dispute over the seabed and Exclusive Economic Zone in the area north of the Natuna islands. 
However, it is absurd to expect that the public can understand the problem and differentiate between 
sovereignty and sovereign right. Some Scholars are: Hensel and Mitchell, Wright. 
20 Issue indivisibility: Hensel and Mitchell explain as: “When territory is valued for intangible 
reasons, such as the presence of sacred sites, one’s ethnic kinsmen, or the scene of pivotal historical 
events.” See: Paul R. Hensel and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, “Issue Indivisibility and Territorial Claims,” 
GeoJournal 64, no. 4 (2005): 275–85, accessed May 5, 2017, https://search.proquest.com/docview/
223669086?pq-origsite=gscholar.  
21 For the differences between tangible and intangible, see Hensel and Mitchell.  
22 Paul R. Hensel and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, “Issue Indivisibility and Territorial Claims,” 
GeoJournal 64, no. 4 (2005): 275–85, accessed May 5, 2017, https://search.proquest.com/docview/
223669086?pq-origsite=gscholar  
23 Some of them are Jeremy Maxie, Ralph Cossa, and Camila Ruz. 
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South China Sea so important. Others argue that the importance of the South China Sea 
lies in its strategic position, which make it worth China going to war. By contrast, some 
argue that the South China Sea is actually not that important. The leaders of those 
claimant states are the ones that make the South China Sea dispute so sensitive.  
The South China Sea is indeed an area that contains a huge amount of natural 
resources. The potential maritime resources, ultimately fisheries, and seabed mining are 
huge. Indeed, the Natuna Sea seabed contains enormous deposit of natural gas.24 A 
recent finding of a huge expository of natural gas seized the attention the world, 
especially in states in the area. Gas as a non-renewable source of energy is a scarce 
natural resource.25 It is important to note, though, that Chinese assertiveness toward other 
claimants, such as the Philippines and Vietnam, has been by far more severe than its 
assertiveness toward Indonesia, even though north Natuna sea has more natural gas 
reserves than the areas claimed by those two countries.26 
The strategic position of the South China Sea is also important, especially for 
China. Strategic containment that the United States exercised in the past to deal with the 
Soviet Union also makes China sensitive toward the South China Sea.27 Based on this 
logic, it is important for China to acquire a vast area in the South China Sea to prevent its 
near peer from encircling China. Yet when one considers that the potential for the 
maritime dispute between China and Indonesia is not so large and that it only regards 
sovereign rights, not populated territories, the importance of this factor may be in doubt.  
Even though the South China Sea area contains a great deal of natural resources 
and has strategic importance, it is worth considering that those factors might not be the 
                                                 
24 “Remote, Gas-Rich Islands on Indonesia’s South China Sea Frontline,” Reuters, August 25, 2014, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-indonesia-natuna-insigh-idUSKBN0GP1WA20140825.  
25 Camila Ruz, “The Six Natural Resources Most Drained by Our 7 Billion People,” Guardian, 
October 31, 2011, sec. Environment, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2011/oct/31/six-
natural-resources-population.  
26 Jeremy Maxie. “The South China Sea Dispute Isn’t About Oil, At Least Not How You Think,” 
Forbes, April 25, 2016, accessed October 18, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeremymaxie/2016/04/
25/the-south-china-sea-dispute-isnt-about-oil-at-least-not-how-you-think/2/#162e7aa63de9.  
27 Ralph A. Cossa, “Security Implications of Conflict in the South China Sea: Exploring Potential 
Triggers of Conflict,” Pacific Forum, CSIS, 1998. http://www.geocities.ws/kweibohuang/SChinaSea.pdf  
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ones that increase the likelihood of escalation. From this perspective, we have to see that 
the state is not monolithic. We have to separate each actor within the state. First, we have 
to differentiate between the public and the leaders. The South China Sea is an object for 
the political leaders of each claimant country, especially China, to use as a political 
commodity for their respective domestic audiences. On the other hand, how attached the 
public feels to the disputed area can also become a factor that forces a leader to act 
aggressively regarding the dispute. The intrinsic values, even when very high, are not 
necessarily the ones that will spark a conflict in the future. Further, the need for leaders to 
look strong when dealing with other countries could be a significant factor for the South 
China Sea’s importance. In other words, a war could be sparked for diversionary reasons, 
as the following section considers.28 
2. Tendency for Rallying ‘Round the Flag 
There are many different perspectives in the literature on diversionary war theory. 
Those various views reflect the fact that not all states have equal chances to divert their 
domestic audiences. Some states are more prone to do so than others, but there is no 
conclusive agreement among scholars as to which kind of states, and what conditions, 
make a state more prone to unite its citizenry to rally ′round the flag.29 Even though there 
is no consensus, it is widely believed that because democratic regimes tend to be more 
responsive in nature, they are also more prone to prompt their citizens to rally ′round the 
flag.30 Clifton Morgan suggests that the United States is not the only one prone to take 
advantage of this effect, and found that the United Kingdom as a democratic state also 
influences its population using the rally ′round the flag effect. On the other hand, Alastair 
Smith argues that because a democratic regime tends to be more accountable than other 
forms of government, such a regime would find using diversionary war more difficult to 
                                                 
28 James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 
379, accessed May 5, 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706903?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.  
29 Rally ′round the flag is how a country’s leaders diverts their public from domestic problems, and 
then gain popularity, by pointing to a common enemy abroad. 
30 Clifton Morgan, “Domestic Support and Diversionary External Conflict in Great Britain, 1950–
1992,” Journal of Politics 61.3 (1999): 799–814. JSTOR. American University, October 20, 2008. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2647829.  
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employ, despite its incentive to do so.31 David H. Clark advances this school of thought 
by proposing strategic conflict avoidance, which neutralizes the use of diversion by 
democratic regimes.32 Mitchell and Prins argue that non-democratic regimes are also 
prone to diversionary war, and that this tendency can be worsened in difficult domestic 
situations. They also found that diversionary war can be seen from an adversarial context, 
and that not all states have equal potential to become adversaries. States in enduring 
rivalries have a higher chance of becoming the target of rally ′round the flag tactics. This 
is due to two reasons. First, because the “commodity” is already available, leaders do not 
need to make up a new one, which might be much more difficult to justify. The second 
reason is that the leaders can easily accuse the target state as the cause of the domestic 
problem itself.  
Another element in the discussion about diversionary war theory is the difference 
between major powers and non-major powers. Several scholars have found that 
diversionary war is more likely to be initiated by a major power. Based on the 
generalized estimating equation (GEE) analyses of SML, Mitchell and Prins’s data on the 
international system from 1960–1999 found that while “normal states” have a tendency to 
pick their diversionary war target through the context of enduring rivalries, for the major 
powers this is not the case.33 Brett Ashley Leeds and David R. Davis also show that the 
likelihood of using diversion to start a war is high only for the most powerful states.34 
Dennis M. Foster argues, though, that actually both major powers and non-major powers 
have a propensity toward diversionary war.35 The difference is how they choose their 
target. Non-major powers tend to pick targets that are their longstanding rivals. 
                                                 
31 Alastair Smith. “Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems,” International Studies 
Quarterly 40, no. 1 (1996): 133–153, https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/40/1/133/1847760  
32 David H. Clark, “Can Strategic Interaction Divert Diversionary Behavior? A Model of U.S. 
Conflict Propensity. Journal of Politics 65, no. 4 (2003): 1013–39, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/
10.1111/1468-2508.t01-1-00123/full  
33 Mitchell and Prins. “Rivalry and Diversionary Uses of Force.”  
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Meanwhile, major powers other than the United States have a tendency to choose rivals 
and non-rivals as targets for rallying ′round the flag, even though they still have a higher 
probability of conflict with rival states.  
Regarding the “commodity” for rallying ′round the flag, it is worth remembering 
that not all issues are created equal. Some issues have more sensitivity and are more “eye 
catching” to the public to become “diversionary objects.” Territorial disputes are one of 
these issues. In the context of territorial disputes, there are also several findings regarding 
diversionary war theory. Jaroslav Tir studied the use of diversionary war specifically in 
the case of territorial disputes, which he calls “territorial diversion.” He argues that 
territorial disputes have stronger appeal because they fit with people’s national identity 
and can be used to consolidate political authority.36 Further, he explains, “People have 
unique and strong bonds to land, which can be manipulated by the unscrupulous leader 
them to mask the true intents of their actions, which include rally effects and retention of 
power.”37  
Similarly, people can easily become emotional and sensitive when the discussion 
turns to territorial disputes. Several scholars focus on the sensitivity of territorial 
disputes.38 On the other hand, some scholars argue that territorial diversion is unlikely. 
Emizet F. Kisangani and Jeffrey Pickering, for example, argue that the risk of using 
territorial disputes to spark an armed conflict is so high that leaders will choose other 
commodities for diversion.39 Scott Sigmund Gartner and Gary M. Segura note that the 
public could easily lose confidence when faced with a long engagement that costs many 
                                                 
36 Jaroslav Tir, “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict.” Journal 
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1992,” International Studies Quarterly 45, no. 1 (2001): 81–109, https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/45/
1/81/1792560. See also: Jaroslav Tir and John A. Vasquez, “Geography and Territory,” International 
Studies Encyclopedia (ISE) 5 (2010), 2948–68. See also: Luigi Valzelly, Psychobiology of Aggression and 
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lives.40 This brings us to the conclusion that leaders would try to find a commodity that 
can easily gather public support, but with low risk of escalating out of control. 
3. Dispute Resolution Methods Typically Used by Both Countries  
China has had many territorial disputes with its neighbors. In recent years, 
negotiations or bilateral relations solved many of the disputes peacefully. Historically, 
though, some of China’s territorial disputes have escalated into armed conflicts. Was this 
because of the inherent value of the territorial dispute itself, or was the territorial dispute 
merely a pretext for other causes? Various scholars have analyzed China’s territorial 
disputes in the past. All of them draw different conclusions. M. Taylor Fravel, in his 2005 
article, tries to refute the diversionary war theory presented by James Fearon, based on an 
analysis of China’s territorial disputes in the past. Fravel argues that China’s pattern of 
cooperation and delay in its territorial disputes stems from China’s regime insecurity. In 
other words, internal conflict induces China to appease its adversaries in territorial 
disputes, and then produce “diversionary peace.”41 Furthermore, in his book: Strong 
Borders Nations, Fravel finds that counterintuitively, China, as a powerful country, has 
had no propensity for using its military power to solve its territorial disputes.42 Ke Wang, 
in 2014, made his own argument by distinguishing China’s frontier disputes from 
maritime disputes. He proposes a theory of the changeability of territorial value to 
explain China’s behavior regarding territorial disputes in the past.43 Territorial values 
consist of economic value, military value, and symbolic value. The higher the economic 
value of a territory, the more likely China would pursue a peaceful solution.44 On the 
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other hand, military value and subjective value are directly proportional to the chances of 
armed conflict resolution.45 However, he also notes that his theory is not applicable in 
maritime disputes, as he discovered that in the maritime disputes, China tended to be 
more opportunistic and more inclined to maintain the status quo.  
Indonesia has never experienced an international war caused by disputes over 
particular territories in the past. Many of Indonesia’s disputes have been solved 
peacefully without the use of force. Delimitation agreements between Indonesia and its 
neighbors are quite common. In the dispute between Indonesia and East Timor, for 
example, even though both states had a hard time during separation, they never reached 
the latent stage of conflict. Both states always tried to pursue goodwill to resolve the 
dispute.46 Other examples of how Indonesia usually tends to solve disputes with peaceful 
settlements are its boundary delimitation agreements with Australia,47 Singapore,48 and 
other neighboring countries. However, it is worth noting that Indonesia has had maritime 
disputes with Malaysia that have repeatedly reached high tensions, even though they have 
never sparked into a war. Several times in the near past, the navies of Indonesia and 
Malaysia have been involved in some incidents.49 In 2009, the Indonesian Vice 
President, Jusuf Kalla, even said that Indonesia should prepare for a war.50 In the 
Ambalat case, which is discussed in more detail in the following chapter, the Indonesian 
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government was facing public pressure to react assertively.51 Even though the situation 
was quite tense, at the end of the day, the Indonesian government successfully calmed 
down its public and avoided a further escalation.52 
  
                                                 
51 Syamsul Hadi. “The Dispute of Ambalat in the Perspective of Indonesian Foreign Policy in the 
Post-New Order Era,” Indonesian Journal of International Law 12 (2014): 1. 
52 Ibid. 
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II. PREVIOUS BEHAVIORS IN RESOLVING TERRITORIAL 
DISPUTES 
A. OVERVIEW 
In this chapter, we consider historical instances of territorial disputes to determine 
how China and Indonesia have behaved in the past when dealing with similar issues as 
the South China Sea. On the Chinese side, we analyze the Sino-Soviet territorial dispute, 
and the Ambalat dispute on the Indonesian side.  
B. SINO-SOVIET TERRITORIAL DISPUTE 
We can trace the dispute regarding the territory between China and the Soviet 
Union back to 1954, when Mao Zedong wanted to discuss the border with his counterpart 
from the Soviet Union.53 The source of the problem itself traced back to the 16th century 
AD. At that time, Russia expanded its territory eastward. After several wars, eventually 
Russia wanted to make peace and made a concession with China in August 1689.54 
Unfortunately, China, which endured a century of humiliation, saw Russia expanded its 
territory again. China had no power to stop the territorial encroachment, which ended 
with the treaty of Aigun in 1858 and the treaty of Peking in 1860.55 The Chinese 
considered both treaties unequal. 
After a long period of civil war, and a struggle against the Japanese occupation as 
well, the Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1949. In 1950, China and the 
Soviet Union signed a mutual defense treaty. It was at a time when both countries had a 
good relationship. In the same year, the Korean War broke out. Both countries supported 
their North Korean comrade. In 1953, Joseph Stalin passed away, and Nikita Khrushchev 
came into power. In 1954, Mao Zedong conveyed his willingness to talk about boundary 
                                                 
53 Ross Terrill, Mao: A Biography (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999). 
54 Neville Maxwell, “How the Sino-Russian Boundary Conflict Was Finally, Settled,” Critical Asian 
Studies 39, no. 2 (2007): 229–53, doi:10.1080/14672710701340079. 
55 Ibid. 
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problems with Nikita Khrushchev. However, Khrushchev refused to discuss it.56 The 
Sino-Soviet split began in 1960, marked by the Soviet recall of its technical expert 
assistance to China. In 1964, Mao voiced his dissatisfaction with many unresolved 
territorial disputes with the Soviet Union during his discussions with members of the 
Japanese socialist party.57 Domestically, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution in 1966 
but wanted to ended it in 1969, after the movement became uncontrollable. 
Following are two competing arguments for the cause of Sino-Soviet war. 
1. First Argument 
The first historical argument states that the Sino-Soviet dispute was really due to 
the territorial boundary issue as an underlying cause, and the escalation of the border as a 
proximate cause. Based on this argument, both sides blamed each other for provoking the 
clash. From China’s point of view, the Soviet Union initiated the conflict.58 On the other 
hand, the Soviet Union blamed China for conducting an ambush on the Soviet’s front 
guards.59 Neville Maxwell in his article “How the Sino-Russian Boundary Conflict Was 
Finally, Settled,” in 2007, argues that the conflict between both countries was genuinely a 
territorial dispute. In a sense, the conflict occurred because of gradual escalation in the 
field. Furthermore, he asserts that other factors contributed to worsening the conflict, 
such as the Sino-Soviet split, China’s domestic politics, and some events in Eastern 
Europe because of Brezhnev’s doctrine.  
This argument seems to have very weak evidence. It is likely that one or both 
countries had other underlying reasons to heighten the tension at the border. This is 
because it was an unprecedented event, and the disputed territory lacked any economic or 
                                                 
56 Dennis J. Doolin, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict: Documents and Analysis (Stanford, 
CA: Hoover Institute on War, 1965), 43. 
57 Ibid., 34. 
58 Neville Maxwell, “Report from China: The Chinese Account of the 1969 Fighting at Chenpao,” 
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59 “Fighting between Soviet and Chinese Frontier Guards on Far Eastern Border,” Keesing’s Record 
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political value. Moreover, this argument also inadequately explains why China’s soldiers 
were well prepared for conflict.  
Such a large-scale conflict never happened before, even though several triggering 
events had already occurred in the past. Before the Zhenbao incident in March 1969, 
several incidents occurred. The first incident can be dated back to 1959.60 In 1962, 
tensions escalated.61 Those triggering events brought both countries into the stage of 
emergence. However, no serious open conflict broke out. Neither country entered the 
escalation stage. Neither country wanted to make the dispute a clash. This is evidenced in 
official Chinese media, which always refuted anti-Soviet expression in the 1950s.62 In 
the 1960s, however, the situation changed. This time, the government publicly expressed 
its concern over the dispute, by saying that the Peking treaty and Aigun treaty were 
unequal treaties. By looking at this sequence of events, we can surmise that Beijing likely 
wanted to curb public concern at the beginning, but went the other way in the late 1960s, 
and not merely because of the gradual increase of escalation in the field. 
Different from other regions where China had so many interests at stake, the Sino-
Soviet disputed area, especially the Amur region, had little intrinsic value. No significant 
consequencesinternally or internationallywould arise if China’s government just 
maintained the status quo at that time. The people would not question the Chinese 
government’s legitimacy just because the leadership maintained the status quo over the 
Amur region. Indeed, during the Hundred Flower Blossom Era (1956–1957), when the 
Chinese people could express their ideas freely, some citizens questioned the Sino-Soviet 
territorial disputes.63 After that era and the end of freedom of expression in China, 
China’s public had already forgotten about the Amur region issue. This is, of course, very 
different from China’s and Taiwan’s dispute over sovereignty and territory, which 
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erupted during almost the same time period and had almost escalated into an open 
conflict between China and United States.  
It also seems clear that the Chinese troops were well prepared for the clash in 
March 1969. Such a high alert army would not be easily provoked by its counterparts, 
unless at the beginning the provocateur already had an intention to escalate the dispute to 
become an open conflict.  
2. Second Argument 
This brings us to the second historical argument, which holds that the Sino-Soviet 
dispute was not rooted in the territorial boundary issue. Rather, the dispute was a pretext 
for action on another real issue. This argument is widely accepted among Chinese and 
Soviet historians. A research report by Lyle J. Goldstein, in 2001, reveals consensus 
among Chinese historians that it was clear that China was the one that attacked first.64 
Furthermore, the attack had been well planned and well executed.65 In 1968, China, with 
a well-led and well-prepared army, tried to provoke a border clash; however, its plan 
could not be executed since the Soviet’s troops did not show up.66  
The changes and new patterns of interaction within Chinese domestic politics 
because of the Cultural Revolution, resulted in both countries entering the escalation 
stage. Mao led a meeting of the Central Military Commission to discuss the Ussury river 
border problem in early 1968, after a provocation by the Soviet guards on January 5, 
1968.67 The result of the meeting was that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) should be 
prepared to deal with a similar such provocation in the future.68 In the same year, 
dissension was growing among Eastern European countries in the Soviet Union, drawing 
Moscow’s attention to that region. The Soviet Union did not want to make its relationship 
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with China more tense. On the other hand, China’s domestic political situation was at its 
lowest point. The Cultural Revolution, waged by Mao Zedong himself from as early as 
1966, was becoming out of control. Riots were everywhere. Since they carried out Mao’s 
own words, the Red Guards felt that it was above all Chinese institutions. Mao tried to re-
establish China’s public order, which was in ruins because of the Cultural Revolution’s 
social movement. Unfortunately, it would not be easy to stop the snowball from rolling. 
In fact, when Zhou Enlai reported to Mao about the second border clash, and Mao said, 
“We should let them come in, which will help us in our mobilization.”69 It became clear 
that Mao hoped to divert domestic attention from the Cultural Revolution and the ensuing 
social unrest to the border clash with the Soviet Union.  
Mao Zedong seemed careful to separate his audiences: the Chinese public and the 
Chinese institutions. He wanted the Chinese public to stop their unrest soon, by 
promulgating the probability of war with Soviet publicly.70 Yet, Mao gave the order for 
the PLA to stop the fight.71 This could be interpreted as a sign that Mao actually was not 
willing to launch a ‘real war’ with the Soviet Union. No significant military build-up had 
occurred in support of such a huge campaign. A leader with tremendous military 
experience like Mao, of course, knew what kind of preparation he had to make to deal 
with a superpower country. And, there was the Taiwan matter to consider. Even more 
troublesome was the domestic problem arising from the Cultural Revolution. China 
undoubtedly wanted to shift its public attention from its domestic problems to the 
possibility of all-out war with the Soviet Union. At the same time, though, Mao tried not 
to provoke the Soviet Union any further, and kept the fledgling conflict in control. 
Another explanation for why China initiated a border conflict with the Soviet 
Union is that of the Sino-Soviet split itself. As Lorenz Luthi said at the launching of his 
new book, the border conflict would not have happened if the Sino-Soviet split had not 
happened in the first place. In other words, the border clash was merely the peak of the 
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Sino-Soviet split escalation. Further, he also mentioned that it all happened because of 
the “Mao factor,” or the ideological differences between Mao and Khrushchev. In Mao’s 
view, Khrushchev was a weak leader because of his peaceful coexistence doctrine and, 
more importantly, for backing down during the Cuban missile crisis. Further, the 
perception of a weak Khrushchev was echoed in the Soviet Union when Khrushchev was 
voted out of office in 1964. Moscow replaced him with quite a strong figure as early as 
1964: Leonid Brezhnev. Brezhnev even dictated the Brezhnev doctrine, which limited 
Western influence in Eastern Europe. At the same time, another argument explaining why 
the conflict did not escalate further, focuses on China’s own doctrine. According to that 
argument, during the Bandung conference in 1955, China itself recognized the five 
principles of peaceful coexistence, derived from the Panchsheel principles.72 Even 
though the Sino-Soviet split was not the main cause of the clash, it is clear that without 
the split itself, the battle would not have happened. 
3. Summary 
We see that several triggering events from 1959 to 1969 brought China and the 
Soviet Union into the stage of emergence. But, the border clash did not occur until there 
were changes within interactions among Chinese leadership on domestic matters. Once 
the patterns of interaction between Mao Zedong, other Chinese political leaders, and the 
Red Guard changed, then China and the Soviet Union stepped into the stage of escalation  
Two underlying causes made the Sino-Soviet border clash happen: The Sino-
Soviet split and the domestic instability in China caused by the Cultural Revolution. 
Without the Sino-Soviet split, China would most likely have made another diversionary 
war but with a state other than the Soviet Union. On the other hand, without the Cultural 
Revolution, China would not have used the territorial dispute issue to initiate a war with a 
superpower like the Soviet Union. While the Chinese troops’ ambush was a proximate 
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cause of the armed conflict between both countries, we can see that the territorial dispute 
largely served as a pretext for China to initiate the clash with the Soviet Union.  
C. AMBALAT DISPUTE 
In terms of disputes with other countries, Indonesia’s dispute with Malaysia over 
Ambalat, a sea block in the Celebes Sea, is the most intense. Like the North Natuna Sea 
dispute, it is not a territorial dispute at all.73 The dispute is actually about the continental 
shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The seabed of the area is rich with oil and 
natural gas reserves.74 The question is what actually caused the escalation of the dispute, 
and why the dispute de-escalated rather than igniting into a war between Indonesia and 
Malaysia. 
We can trace the dispute back to 1967 when both countries wanted to resolve 
maritime boundaries. In 1969, both sides agreed to sign the delimitation of continental 
shelves, but they could not agree on the status of two small islands: Sipadan and 
Ligitan.75 In 1979, Malaysia asserted its claim by publishing new charts, which were met 
by protests from many of its neighbors, including Indonesia.76 In the new charts, 
Malaysia claimed both islands, Sipadan and Ligitan, along with their surrounding waters, 
which include the Ambalat block.77 Then, in 1996, both countries agreed to submit the 
problem to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for resolution.78 In 2002, the ICJ 
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announced its verdict that both islands belonged to Malaysia.79 Based on that verdict, 
Malaysia argued that the Ambalat block is part of both islands’ EEZ and therefore 
belongs to Malaysia.80 On the other hand, Indonesia maintains that since Malaysia is not 
an archipelagic state,81 it cannot draw an archipelagic baseline as Indonesia, an 
archipelagic state, does.82 As a result, the entire Ambalat block is within the Indonesian 
EEZ. Even though there was a disagreement regarding the ownership of the Ambalat 
block EEZ and continental shelf, both countries maintained the status quo on Ambalat for 
a few years. 
In 2005, the status quo was upset after a Malaysian oil company gave the Ambalat 
block concession to Shell.83 The Indonesian free-press smartly caught the public emotion 
by openly putting the Ambalat dispute on the front-page. Before long, the Indonesian 
public got irritated with the situation and demanded the government to act firmly 
regarding the dispute. On April 8, 2005, a trigger event happened when an Indonesian 
navy ship and a Malaysian navy ship almost rammed one another. At that point, both 
countries entered the stage of emergence. Nonetheless, both countries preferred to 
maintain the status quo, and Indonesia and Malaysia never reached the stage of 
escalation.  
We consider three arguments for why the Ambalat dispute proceeded in this 
manner. 
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1. First Argument 
The first argument states that the Ambalat block dispute is all about economic 
value. Twenty percent of all Indonesian oil production is refined from this area. The total 
reserves of the Ambalat block are about 62 million barrels of oil and 348 billion cubic 
feet of natural gas.84 However, even though the Ambalat is certainly rich in natural 
resources, but escalation of the dispute did not rest solely on that factor. In fact, 
Indonesia’s economy is highly dependent on income from Malaysian tourists and on 
investment from Malaysia. Furthermore, Indonesia has many laborers work in 
Malaysia.85 Thus, for economic reasons, it would make more sense not to escalate the 
dispute. 
Even though the EEZ associated with Ambalat is economically valuable, 
economic matters were not the underlying cause of increasing tensions. Rather, the public 
demand for the government to react firmly to the Malaysian oil company’s concession of 
Ambalat to Shell put pressure on Indonesian leaders. Otherwise, the opposition party 
would have taken that chance to bring down the government’s credibility. 
2. Second Argument  
The second argument also holds that the tension surrounding Ambalat did not 
dramatically increase because of the intrinsic value of the sea block. Rather, the blend of 
the enduring rivalries between the two countries countries, and a burst of Indonesian 
nationalism, were the conditions that made for high tension. Based on this argument, the 
Ambalat dispute was only a trigger for the tension between both countries. Without the 
Ambalat dispute, there would still have been other problems with the potential to increase 
the tension between the two countries.  
A long history of bitter relations between two countries can cause any issue to 
intensify between them. Dating back to the 1960s, Mr. Soekarno, Indonesian president, 
launched a confrontation policy against Malaysia, in order to thwart the establishment of 
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a Malaysia confederation.86 After the fall of Soekarno’s regime, the relationship between 
both countries began to thrive, but the memories of enmity with Malaysia are real and can 
be heightened at any time by the government, or as in the Ambalat case, by the media.87  
Consequently, Indonesian nationalism was one of the most important factors in 
the escalation of the Ambalat dispute. It is important to note, however, that the 
Indonesian public’s nationalism is not targeted at all countries and all issues equally. 
Enduring rivalries produce the targets for the lion’s share of the nationalism. In 
particular, three countries usually become targets of public rallies in Indonesia: The 
United States, Australia, and Malaysia. In general, the rallies that target the United States 
center on religion rather than Indonesian nationalism, and in the case of Australia, the 
Indonesian public has never demanded a direct confrontation. But if the problem involves 
Malaysia, that same level restraint is not necessarily the case. The sensitivity of the issue 
is another factor that is important to note. Even though it is clear that all of the issues 
related with Malaysia, including the Indonesian workers issue, cultural heritage disputes, 
or even the Manohara issue,88 all have the potential to flare up, but undoubtedly, all else 
being equal, the Ambalat “territorial dispute” was the most sensitive issue of all.  
3. Third Argument  
The third argument holds that the cause of the heightened tension about Ambalat 
was that the key actors used the situation as a political commodity. According to this 
argument, the main actor, the government as a whole, used the issue to divert Indonesian 
public attention from domestic problems. High unemployment rates and fuel prices were 
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among several issues that decreased the government’s popularity.89 Indeed, the 
Indonesian government wanted to show that it could flex its muscle but then reduced its 
intense posture afterward.  
The reason why the Indonesian government took a firm stance is twofold: to 
satisfy the public, and to prevent its political opponents from using the issue as a weapon 
to discredit the government. The Indonesian government tried to send a signal for its 
public audience by declaring that the regime would not back down in dealing with 
Malaysia. Once the government felt that its stance had satisfied the Indonesian public’s 
thirst for nationalism, the Indonesian government used the diplomatic channel to calm the 
situation. The opposition party, ultimately the one that won seats in the parliament, tried 
to influence the government by urging the leadership to do more to defend Indonesia. 
Several of these leaders even joined the rally outside Malaysia’s embassy in Jakarta, and 
yelled for crushing Malaysia.90 The Indonesian government’s motivations can be seen in 
how the Indonesian president gave different explanations regarding his actions to the 
Malaysian government. The Indonesian president, Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 
clarified to his Malaysian counterpart that his visit to Ambalat was just to remind the 
military personnel in the frontline to be careful in handling the situation.91 The president 
also gave a guarantee to the Malaysian government that he could handle the situation and 
even lower the tension.92  
4. Summary  
In the Ambalat dispute, the escalation reached its height because Indonesian 
nationalism flared up. The Indonesian government itself in this instance was passive. 
Even though there were some domestic problems during that time, overall, Indonesia was 
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quite stable. Thus, the Indonesian government had no motivation to divert its public from 
domestic problems by pointing a finger at Malaysia as a common enemy. It did not want 
to increase the tension with its neighbor. Malaysia became a target of Indonesian 
nationalism largely because of the enduring rivalry between the two countries rather than 
because of the Ambalat issue specifically.  
D. CONCLUSION 
In the case of the Sino-Soviet Union border conflict, the initial border dispute was 
the focal point for several unrelated heated issues. These issues included the deteriorating 
relations between China and the Soviet Union, which were marked by the Sino-Soviet 
split, and Mao’s intention to divert the Chinese public’s attention from the Cultural 
Revolution, by mobilizing the Chinese people over the war between China and the Soviet 
Union. China actually would have had no intention to reclaim its territory from the Soviet 
Union, if there had not been a Sino-Soviet split in the first place. This demonstrates the 
strong role that international rivalry can play in the escalation of territorial disputes. 
From these historical lessons, we can draw some conclusions that are applicable 
in the South China Sea dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia. The first is that China is 
not likely to consider the intrinsic value of the disputed area as a cause to attack 
Indonesia in the first place. Rather, China would most likely go to war as a response to its 
domestic instability, or in other words, when nationalism can be used to shore up the 
current regime’s power at home, as happened during Sino-Soviet border conflict. As we 
saw in that conflict, the transition from the emergence stage to the escalation stage 
occurred soon after there were changes and new patterns of interaction within Chinese 
domestic politics. 
In the case of the Ambalat dispute, we can see that the Indonesian democratic 
government in the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono era had no inclination to use the dispute 
as a political commodity to divert public attention to a common enemy. The Indonesian 
government behaved assertively to its enduring rival, Malaysia, only to meet the public 
demand. Eventually, in fact, the Indonesian government successfully managed the 
dispute to avoid an open conflict with Malaysia.  
 27 
From this dispute, we can draw some lessons that we can apply in today’s 
maritime dispute between China and Indonesia in the South China Sea. In particular, it 
implies that in the case of a maritime dispute between Indonesia and China, with high 
probability, the Indonesian government would work to curb its public demand to act 
assertively. In the Ambalat case, even though trigger events occurred and both countries, 
Indonesia and Malaysia, entered the stage of emergence, no further escalation took place. 
This outcome may be attributed to the absence of change and new patterns of interaction 
within Indonesia’s domestic politics. 
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III. NATIONALISM IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 
SOUTH CHINA SEA ISSUE 
In this chapter, we discuss whether today’s nationalism in China and Indonesia 
might significantly influence the escalation of the dispute between the two countries. We 
measure the level of nationalism by comparing the public responses to media reports 
about the North Natuna Sea dispute in recent years with the respective public response to 
other sensitive issues already shown to raise public nationalism in each country. For 
China, we compare the public sensitivity to the South China Sea dispute with the Chinese 
public sensitivity to the China-Japan issue, the China-U.S. issue, and the Taiwan issue. In 
the case of Indonesia, we compare the public sensitivity to the South China Sea dispute 
with the public sensitivity toward disputes and with other countries in recent years. 
A. CHINESE NATIONALISM AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ISSUE 
In the late 1980s, pushed by the economic deterioration of the Soviet Union, there 
was an outbreak in the communist world. The coming of “the third wave” of 
democratization swept away communism as an ideology and its authoritarian model of 
government.93 To address with this potential threat, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
tried to find a solution, so its public would not demand democratization in the future. 
Ziang Zemin, then general secretary of the CCP, used the “century of humiliation” 
narrative, which relies on historical memories of the period from the mid-19th to mid-
20th century when China endured Western intervention and Japanese imperialism, to 
raise the level of Chinese nationalism.94 Too high a level of nationalism, however, could 
also cause an unbearable side effect, resulting in the collapse of the regime. Recently, Dr. 
Susan Shirk found that the Chinese public’s nationalism rises in response to at least three 
sensitive issues: the Japan problem, the Taiwan problem, and the U.S. problem.95 
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Conscious of this situation, China always tries to use its nationalism carefully when it has 
one of those three problems at hand. The Chinese government does not want public 
nationalism to become uncontrollable. Unfortunately, China now has a new problem, 
which is the South China Sea issue. So far, there is still no clear-cut answer as to whether 
the South China Sea problem is a sensitive issue for the Chinese public. 
1. The Medicine for China: Nationalism 
To maintain its “mandate of heaven” as a one-party rule, the CCP has consistently 
tried to find additional sources of legitimacy. Jiang Zemin, a relatively weak leader 
compared to all of his predecessors,96 used nationalist sentiment as leverage to increase 
the party’s legitimacy to govern. Different from Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Deng 
Xiaoping who had revolutionary experience, Jiang, as one of a new generation of leaders, 
lacked the power to become as strong an authoritarian leader as Mao and Deng.97 To 
promote nationalism, Jiang created a new program in the form of a “patriotic education 
campaign.”98 The idea was to revive the Chinese memory of misery during the century of 
national humiliation.  
The narrative of national humiliation, which emerged following the student-led 
protests that ended in a massacre in Tiananmen Square in 1989, is not new. The 
nationalists in Taiwan had already used this paradigm long before CCP leaders harnessed 
it for political purposes in the post-Tiananmen incident. Dr. Sun Yat-Sen and Chiang Kai 
Sek were two nationalist leaders who staunchly wielded this tool to gather Chinese public 
support.99 However, that narrative of China ultimately prevailing over foreign 
imperialism relied on the role of the Kuomintang, which has lost popularity in 
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contemporary Taiwan. Consequently, the century of humiliation narrative is no longer 
ingrained in the Taiwan public’s mind.100 
Following the Tiananmen Square incident, as previously mentioned, the CCP 
tried to use nationalism as a source of legitimacy to govern. By initiating a campaign to 
boost patriotism in 1991, the CCP particularly targeted the Chinese youth for its 
propaganda.101 The Chinese government implemented its regulations for all levels of 
education, from kindergarten to university.102 The effort was apparently successful. In 
the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, which emanated from Chinese missile tests, the Chinese 
public vehemently supported their government in opposition to the United States and 
Taiwan, without much prodding from the government to “rally ′round the flag.”  
The patriotic education campaign promoted the theme of the century of 
humiliation into modern Chinese life. Deng acknowledged the importance of the patriotic 
education campaign by saying,  
I have told foreign guests that during the last 10 years our biggest mistake 
was made in the field of education, primarily in ideological and political 
educationnot just of students but of the people in general. We did not 
tell them enough about the need for hard struggle, about what China was 
like in the old days, and what kind of a country it was to become. That was 
a serious error on our part.103 
In order to fix this mistake, beginning in 1991, the CCP leaders formulated a way 
to implement a patriotic education campaign. That year, Jiang was quoted in the People’s 
Daily, saying: 
We should conduct education on Chinese modern and contemporary 
history and national conditions to pupils (even to the kids in kindergarten), 
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middle school students and to the university students. The education 
should go from the easy to the difficult, and should be persistent.104  
Different from governments in other countries, which used nationalism to form 
nation-states after World War II, the CCP used revolution as a theme of the success of 
class struggle. Mao, as an ideologically driven leader had a strong belief in Marxism. 
Based on class struggle theory, nationalism is only a short-term objective before 
achieving the long-term objective of subjugating all of the bourgeoisie in the world, and 
uniting all the proletariat throughout the world. Thus, when Khrushchev denounced 
Stalin in a secret speech in 1956, Mao criticized Khrushchev for being a revisionist. In 
fact, Mao even had no resentment toward Japan. In Mao’s era, CCP leaders saw the 
Japanese motive in World War II, including the Japanese invasion of China, as being 
driven by capitalist greed to get raw materials and markets. As a staunch communist, 
Mao believed that Japanese workers and peasants were actually victims as well.105 
Driven by this ideological motive, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) during Mao’s 
era went to war in Korea and helped the North during the early phase of the war in 
Vietnam. Mao even had to abort plan to invade Taiwan in order for China to help its 
North Korean comrade. In Mao’s era, the theme was that China’s decline was due to an 
internal factor within the Qing dynasty and the Kuomintang regime.106  
In the past, Mao always depicted China as a winner that could beat imperialism. 
In the patriotic education campaign of the post-Tiananmen period, however, the Chinese 
government depicted China as a victim of imperialism.107 Mao always proudly told the 
narrative of the victory of class struggle against Western and Japan imperialism, and 
against Kuomintang bourgeoisie.108 The Chinese nationalists under Chiang Kai Shek, on 
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the other hand, always used the Chinese humiliation theme to gather support for their 
struggle prior to the Chinese civil warsomething that Chinese Communist Party did not 
even think about at that time. Because of the pragmatic need to maintain support for the 
party, in the post-Tiananmen era, the Chinese depiction as a victim was much better fit to 
boost nationalism. This paradigm could unite all Chinese, particularly the Han Chinese, 
which comprised around 92 percent of the Chinese citizens, under the CCP. This freed 
the CCP to deal with the common threats, which were the Japanese and Western 
imperialism. This co-optation of the national humiliation narrative after the Tiananmen 
incident was important to boost nationalism in China. Fears of revolt force the Chinese 
government to do whatever it takes, including the pursuit of assertive foreign policy, to 
calm down the Chinese public.109  
2. Three Core Issues in Chinese Public Nationalism: Japan, Taiwan, and 
the United States 
In her book, Shirk makes a very interesting point about the three main subjects to 
which the Chinese government would devote its energy: Japan, Taiwan, and the United 
States.110 All issues related to these three subjects would be managed by the central 
government. It means that these issues are the ones that concern the Chinese government 
the most. This is because these matters are the main issues that are very sensitive for the 
Chinese public.  
China-Japan relations are the most sensitive issue for the Chinese public. This is 
due to Japanese atrocities committed against the Chinese people before and during World 
War II, and the Chinese government’s effort to use the memory of the Japanese atrocities 
to boost nationalism in the post-Tiananmen Square incident era. The Japanese atrocities 
are still remembered by many Chinese who either were victims of the atrocities 
themselves or saw the atrocities first hand. Naturally, all those memories were passed to 
their children and grandchildren. Even without any government propaganda to remind the 
Chinese public, the public memories of the Japanese atrocities already exist. Considering 
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the need to boost Chinese public nationalism in order for the CCP to stay in power, after 
the Tiananmen incident in 1989, the Chinese government picked the most available 
theme, which was the Japanese occupation and past atrocities. There are a total of 20 
museums and public monuments to revive the memory of anti-Japanese war, from 1937–
1945.111 The Chinese government also uses the media, for example film, to depict the 
war and stir anti-Japanese sentiment.112 The Sino-Japanese relations issue has been the 
easiest way for Chinese leaders to rally the public ′round the flag. 
The Taiwan issue is the second most sensitive topic for the Chinese public. As a 
vanguard of the country, the CCP differentiates itself from the Qing dynasty, which lost 
much of its territories during the century of humiliation. The CCP has realized that it 
must not repeat the same mistake as the Qing dynasty. The failure to act correctly on the 
Taiwan issue could endanger the CCP’s legitimacy to govern. One of the biggest 
challenges for the PRC today is the possibility for Taiwan to declare independence. 
Because of the decline of the Kuomintang’s popularity, the chance for Taiwan to separate 
itself from mainland China is increasing.  
As the strongest superpower in the world, the United States is the only state that 
could repeat the Chinese humiliation in the current era. As the second superpower in the 
world, the Chinese public realizes that today, no country in the world can humiliate China 
other than the United States. As in the past, Western powers, Russia, and Japan could 
easily humiliate China by imposing unequal treaties. Today, arguably only the United 
States has the power to make such things happen. For example, only the United States 
has the courage to challenge China’s claim of jurisdiction over its own EEZ, by 
conducting the Freedom of Navigation program. The United States role as an ally of 
Japan and Taiwan makes the relations between China and the United States even more 
precarious. Issues related to China–United States relations can seize the Chinese public’s 
attention.  
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Today, the Chinese government can no longer use nationalism for matters that 
deal with these three issues.113 These issues could boost Chinese public nationalism to 
the point that it could endanger the sustainability of the regime itself. The public anger in 
response to the acts of Japanese, Taiwan, or U.S. leaders could be redirected at China’s 
own government ifbased on the Chinese public’s perspectivethe government did not 
act properly to protect Chinese interests vis-à-vis those three countries. These three 
subjects, then, have become contra-indications for the medicine of Chinese nationalism. 
3. Avoiding Overdose: Nationalism and the South China Sea  
Different from issues related to Japan, Taiwan, and the United States, the South 
China Sea issue is a subject that is not as sensitive for the Chinese public. Chinese leaders 
today have no tendency to use Japan, Taiwan, and the United States as a political 
commodity, since they realize the danger of playing those three cards. The out-of-control 
nationalism regarding those three subjects could lead the regime to an end. On the other 
hand, the Chinese government still considers the potential of boosting nationalism to 
serve its political purposes regarding the South China Sea issue as a low risk political 
commodity. The Chinese leaders assume the South China Sea issue can be used to “wag 
the dog” without significant consequences. However, the Chinese government must 
realize its fragility and make sure that it would not spin out of control. Once the Chinese 
government takes the nationalism “pills,” it can be difficult not to get addicted. Three 
factors that related to the South China Sea issue could cause the Chinese government to 
suffer an adverse reaction: formal education, the media, and the passport incident. 
It seems that the Chinese government reiterates its mistakes by educating its 
citizens regarding the South China Sea. The insertion of the South China Sea issue into 
textbooks for students could gradually develop their sense of belonging. In geography 
classes, Chinese students know very well where the southernmost part of the Chinese 
                                                 
113 Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower. 
 36 
territory falls.114 As a result, there is little wonder that a survey found a high degree of 
confidence among the Chinese public about the possession of the South China Sea.115 
The majority of Chinese citizens even agreed with bringing the South China Sea case to 
the international tribunal.116  
By using the media, the Chinese government also cultivates a feeling of strong 
ties between the Chinese and the South China Sea. Documentary programs regarding the 
history of the South China Sea from the Chinese perspective seek to make the Chinese 
public unaware of the “other version” of history. Articles and materials are almost always 
lopsided toward the Chinese claim. Moreover, the statements made by public officials 
sharpen the grassroots perspective about who owns the South China Sea. 
In 2012, the Chinese government published a new passport for its citizens. This 
passport included a map of China, which encompassed the South China Sea.117 One 
interesting point to note is the absence of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands from the new 
passport’s map.118 It might be too small to be included in the map, or it might have been 
intentionally left out.119 It is likely that the Chinese government consciously sees the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu island dispute between China and Japan as a case that could endanger 
the Chinese government itself, since it would trigger public anger. On the other hand, the 
inclusion of the South China Sea on the new passport’s map suggests that the Chinese 
leaders feel the South China Sea issue would not boost Chinese nationalism to a level that 
the Chinese government could not manage. Even though the Chinese government’s 
reason behind the publication of the new passport, whether to “educate” its citizens about 
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Chinese territory or as an opportunity to rally them ′round the flag, is not clear the result 
is clear. It indicates that the Chinese sense of belonging and the feeling of attachment to 
the South China Sea is growing and becoming stronger.  
Additional problems are the potential perceptions within the Chinese public that 
the United States is the puppet master behind the South China Sea problem120 and that 
the South China Sea issue is a legacy of the Chinese century of humiliation.121 If this 
were the case, the degree of sensitivity would rise easily. Even though it is unclear 
whether this is part of the Chinese “education campaign,” the snowball has already begun 
rolling, and it could become bigger over time.  
After the ruling of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in 
2013, it became evident that the Chinese government seemed to realize its mistake. The 
public anger caused by the ITLOS verdict, which rejected the Chinese claim regarding 
the South China Sea with its Nine-Dash Line as historical claim, overwhelmed the 
Chinese government. Even though the Chinese public reaction was only limited to social 
media, without any real movement or rally, it revealed that the issue sparked huge 
nationalism among the Chinese grassroots.122 The Chinese government worried that the 
public anger could become out of control. To calm the situation, the Chinese government 
used censorship as its weapon.123 It removed some controversial postings and ultra-
nationalist comments.124  
However, while the degree of national pride is much less tied to the South China 
Sea dispute than it is to other issues, over time, the sensitivity of the South China Sea 
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dispute may increase, unless the Chinese government addresses the situation. If this 
situation continues, the Chinese government could find itself in a situation in which no 
one in the government would dare to act as an outlier, since he or she would be 
considered as a betrayer of his or her own constituents. Another possibility is that the 
Chinese government’s actions to reduce tensions in the South China Sea could be used by 
political rivals as a weapon to remove the administration from office. If this snowball 
continues rolling, a hawkish approach by the Chinese government to deal with the South 
China Sea issue could become increasingly likely.  
4. Conclusion 
The bitterness over the Tiananmen incident led the Chinese government to use 
nationalism to replace communism as a basis of legitimacy. However, by promoting a 
high degree of nationalism, the Chinese government has unleashed another movement 
that can endanger the survival of the regime. The Chinese government has realized the 
sensitivity of issues related to Taiwan, Japan, and the United States. In those three 
matters, the Chinese government knows that escalation risks are high and that conflicts 
should be avoided. In contrast, the Chinese government has been able to use the emerging 
issue of the South China Sea to gain “credit” from the Chinese public. However, some 
signs indicate that the South China Sea issue has become more sensitive than before. The 
trend is becoming evident that over time, the Chinese public’s nationalism in regard to 
the South China Sea is increasing. It is therefore possible that in the near future, the South 
China Sea issue will become more difficult to control. 
B. INDONESIAN NATIONALISM AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ISSUE 
In the post-reformation era, Indonesian nationalism emanates from anti-colonialist 
sentiment, maintaining that Indonesia needs to worry about its territorial integrity, which 
can be encroached on by foreigners, especially Western imperialists. In the post-
reformation era, the Indonesian public is becoming more sensitive to territorial disputes 
after several cases that nearly resulted in Indonesian disintegration. However, in the case 
of the South China Sea dispute with China, it turned out that even though the Indonesian 
media tried to sell the issue to the public, but because China has never been targeted by 
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Indonesian nationalism in the past, and China has never become Indonesia’s enduring 
rival, the South China Sea issue has never become a sensitive issue among the Indonesian 
public.  
1. History of Indonesian Nationalism 
Indonesian nationalism was first celebrated in 1928 when youth representatives of 
many regions all over the archipelago held a youth congress.125 This pre-independence 
nationalism targeted the Dutch as a colonial power. The purpose of this movement was to 
liberate Indonesia from a foreigner. After Indonesia declared its independence in 1945, 
nationalism was a useful tool to resist the Dutch, who wanted to recolonize Indonesia.  
After Indonesia gained recognition as a free and independent country in 1949, it 
entered what is widely known as the “old order era.” During this period, Soekarno was 
still maintaining anti-colonialism as a source of Indonesian nationalism. In 1961, he 
launched Operasi Trikora or the Trikora campaign to take back West Papua from the 
Dutch. In 1963, Soekarno launched konfrontasi or the confrontation campaign against the 
Federation of Malaya. The very well-known rhetoric that he used at that time was 
“ganyang Malaysia” or “crush Malaysia.” Many times in his public speech, he mentioned 
that Indonesia was under siege from colonialist powers. From south, there was Australia, 
which was part of the commonwealth, and from north, there was a newly established 
Malaysia Federation, which was backed by the British.  
After the fall of Soekarno in the late 1960s, the confrontation policy came to a 
sudden stop.126 Soeharto, as the new leader, had a very different approach from his 
predecessor. He made peace with Malaysia, and ended the confrontation policy.127 There 
was no more anti-colonialism rhetoric, which targeted Western-affiliated countries. In 
contrast, Soeharto got even closer to the Western bloc to curb the influence of 
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communism in Southeast Asia.128 The narrative of anti-colonialism that characterized 
nationalism still existed, but only limited to the Dutch as Indonesia’s former colonizer. 
The Indonesian government in this era also added anti-communist ideology to the 
narrative of nationalism. In line with those two narratives of nationalism, in 1975 
Indonesia invaded East Timor. The Indonesian government narrative to justify the 
invasion was just the same as that of Soekarno’s era, which centered on anti-
colonialism,129 but with a motive to prevent East Timor from falling into communist 
control.130  
2. Reformation Era and Nationalism 
In the post-reformation era, which began in 1998, the Indonesian public became 
more sensitive to territorial nationalism.131 The old rhetoric that warned Indonesians to 
always be wary of other countries, especially colonialists, who are envious of Indonesian 
richness, seemed fit with Indonesian condition in the post-reformation era. Other 
countries would not be happy with the unity of Indonesia, according to this narrative, and 
would try to divide Indonesia into pieces as the Dutch did in the past. After the fall of 
Soeharto in 1998, Indonesia was facing disintegration. Ethnic and religious conflicts 
erupted in several parts of Indonesia. Secessionist movements also showed up in several 
regions. The separation of East Timor from Indonesia in 1999 exacerbated this condition. 
Even worse, three years later, the International Court of Justice ruling that recognized 
Malaysia as the owner of the Sipadan and Ligitan islands stunned many Indonesians.132 
For Indonesians, this situation represented a close call that could have resulted in the 
balkanization of Indonesia.  
                                                 
128 One of Indonesian motives to invade East Timor in 1975 was to curb the spread of communism in 
Southeast Asia. 
129 The Indonesian government used a narrative of the same feeling as a former colony country as 
East Timor.  
130 The Fretilin, a leftist party, became so popular that the Indonesian government and Western bloc 
countries and affiliates began to fear that East Timor would fall under communist rule, and then the Soviet 
Union could use it as a military base. 
131 Edward Aspinall, “The New Nationalism in Indonesia,” Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies 3, no. 1 
(January 2016): 72–82, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/app5.111/full.  
132 Ligitan, Sovereignty Over Pulau, and Pulau Sipadan, “Judgment,” International Court of Justice 
Rep. No. 625 (2002). 
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On the other hand, democratization in Indonesia undoubtedly provides a high 
degree of the freedom of expression today. In the reformation era, politicians and public 
figures have been able to speak on any topic and express their opinion on it. The 
politicians, especially from the left wing party, and Soekarno sympathizers are the ones 
who have commented in the media about reviving the idea of “ganyang Malaysia” or 
“crush Malaysia.” They have been the ones that remind the public of a dark history 
between Indonesia and Malaysia. They use Soekarno’s idea and rhetoric of anti-
colonialism, which targeted Malaysia to launch his konfrontasi policy. Likewise, the 
media in Indonesia also has been unleashed. The free press eventually will result in a 
market-oriented press, which always competes for a sensational topic. The press will 
capture what the public wants to see and read. 
In the case of East Timor, the Indonesian public did notice Australia’s 
involvement, which eventually led to Indonesia’s loss of East Timor. Australia’s motive 
for its involvement, whether humanitarian or political, is not important. But, one thing is 
for sure: the Indonesian public became aware that foreigners, especially members of the 
Western bloc, would try to dismantle Indonesia, as described in Soekarno’s rhetoric in 
the 1960s during his confrontation policy.133  
Quite fit with the rhetoric is the sand dispute between Singapore and Indonesia. In 
order to reclaim land, Singapore needs to import sand from Indonesia. Meanwhile, since 
Singapore reclaimed its land toward Indonesian waters, there is an anxiety among 
Indonesians that in the future Singapore could shift its boundary because of a different 
interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 
1982.134 If so, Singapore would encroach on Indonesian territorial waters in the 
Singapore Strait.  
                                                 
133 In Soekarno’s speech during the “ganyang Malaysia” campaign, many times he warned about 
imperialist powers, ultimately Great Britain with its commonwealth, including Australia and New Zealand.  
134 Wisnu Yudha AR, “Reklamasi Singapura Sebagai Potensi Konflik Delimitasi Perbatasan 
Indonesia-Singapura [Singapore’s Reclamation As a Potential of Conflict of Indonesia-Singapore 
Boundary Delimitation],” (PhD diss., Airlangga University, 2007), 3–8. 
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3. Target of Indonesian Nationalism: Enduring Rival 
As territorial disputes are becoming a more sensitive topic among the Indonesian 
public, how the Indonesian public will react on a specific dispute is dependent on the 
country involved. In the contemporary era, there are three countries usually targeted by 
Indonesian nationalism: Malaysia, Australia, and to some degree, Singapore. All of these 
are prime targets, of course, because of their proximity to Indonesia, and because of old 
memories from the konfrontasi era. The Indonesian public sees them as the embodiment 
of colonialist power in the region. It is worth noting, though, that the Indonesian public 
does not see these three countries as targets of nationalism equally. Undoubtedly, 
Malaysia is the one seen as an enduring rival by the Indonesian public. 
As for the name, it is obvious that Malaysia was the one that Soekarno mentioned 
many times in his speech to crush Malaysia or ganyang Malaysia. Even though at that 
time Singapore was part of Malaysia, in fact, the Indonesian military sent two marines to 
terrorize Singapore.135 Yet, the Indonesian public today cannot fully understand that 
Singapore was part of the target of the ganyang Malaysia campaign. Meanwhile, 
Australia was targeted because it was one of the commonwealth states that helped 
Malaysia during the confrontation era.136 
Indonesian migrant worker problems also have a tendency to make the Indonesian 
public angry. Because of Malaysia’s need for a huge number of workers in 1970s, many 
unskilled laborers from Indonesia emigrated illegally to Malaysia.137 There are a million 
Indonesian workers in Malaysia, some of them are legal, but many of them are illegal 
                                                 
135 Mohamed Effendy, Abdul Hamid, and Kartini Saparudin, “MacDonald House Bomb Explosion,” 
Singapore Infopedia. National Library Board Singapore. August 7, 2014, http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/
infopedia/articles/SIP_62_2004-12-17.html.  
136 In Soekarno’s speech during the “ganyang Malaysia” campaign, many times he warned about 
imperialist powers, ultimately Great Britain with its commonwealth, including Australia and New Zealand.  
137 Richard Dorall and Shanmugam R. Paramasivam, “Gender Perspectives on Indonesian Labour 
Migration to Peninsular Malaysia: A Case Study,” in Population Studies Unit’s International Colloquium, 
Migration, Development and Gender in the ASEAN Region, (Coral Beach Resort, Kuantan, Pahang, 1992), 
13. 
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workers.138 Over time, the relationship between Malaysia and Indonesia has become like 
that of a master and slave. A pejorative term “Indon” has become daily use among 
Malaysians in referring to Indonesian workers. How Malaysian masters treat their 
Indonesian workers arbitrarily makes for sensational news in the Indonesian free press in 
the post-reformation era. Not to mention, much of this news taps the vengeance that 
many returning workers have after they were treated high-handedly by their master or 
even the Malaysian police. When they get back home, they share their grievances with 
their relatives, friends, or even the media. They tell how Malaysians degrade Indonesians 
and how they treat Indonesian workers like slaves. Many of them then became volunteers 
for the “second ganyang Malaysia” during the Ambalat crisis in 2005.139 All of these 
worker issues aggravate relations with Malaysia, giving the impression that Malaysia 
undermines Indonesian national dignity. 
Another interesting facet of these nations’ relationship is highlighted by the 
Manohara Odelia Pinot case and the cultural heritage dispute between Indonesia and 
Malaysia. Both cases are unique, in the sense that it is rare in international relations for 
the relations between two or more countries to be influenced by non-political economic 
issues. In the case of Manohara, Indonesian public nationalism was boosted by a 
melodramatic household affair.140 In the case of the cultural heritage dispute, Indonesian 
nationalism flared up in response to the use of shared culture in a Malaysian tourism 
advertisement.141 As a comparison, Singapore, which also shares some cultural heritage 
with both countries, never has become a target of Indonesian cultural nationalism. For 
                                                 
138 Graeme Hugo, “Indonesian Labour Migration to Malaysia: Trends and Policy Implications,” 
Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science 21, no. 1 (1993), https://search.proquest.com/docview/
1311777503?pq-origsite=gscholar  
139 Liputan6.com, “TKI Ilegal Siap Membela Tanah Air [Indonesian Illegal Workers Are Ready to 
Defend Their Country],” March 8, 2005, http://news.liputan6.com/read/97127/tki-ilegal-siap-membela-
tanah-air.  
140 Stuart Whatley, “Manohara Odelia Pinot Kidnapping, Abuse Accusations Upset Indonesia-
Malaysia Relations,” Huffington Post, June 15, 2009, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/15/
manohara-odelia-pinot-kid_n_215625.html.  
141 Luke Hunt, “Indonesia, Malaysia in Dance War,” Diplomat, June 29, 2012, 
https://thediplomat.com/2012/06/2192indonesia-malaysia-in-dance-war/.  
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example, Singapore Airlines’ use of the word “Krisflyers” and the wearing of a batik 
uniform have never become an issue that can spark Indonesian public nationalism.  
From the previous discussion, we can conclude that even though Indonesia is 
becoming more sensitive to territorial disputes, we cannot generalize that response to all 
cases in the future that may be similar to the Ambalat dispute with Malaysia. Not all 
territorial disputes will end up with a huge sense of nationalism among the Indonesian 
public as it happened during the Ambalat crisis in 2005. The enduring rivalry with 
Malaysia and the availability of anti-Malaysia rhetoric from the past are important in 
determining whether a territorial dispute would become a sensitive issue for the 
Indonesian public. 
4. Putting to the Test: The South China Sea Dispute 
Several times in recent years, there have been incidents between the Indonesian 
Navy and Chinese vessels, including fishing vessels and Chinese coast guard ships. In the 
most recent incident at the time of this writing, a Chinese coast guard ship tried to hinder 
Indonesian authority by ramming a fishing vessel, and there was no outrage among 
Indonesian public. There was no public protest. It is worth asking why it is very easy for 
Indonesian public to curse Malaysia, but not so much if it comes to China.  
Different from the sensitivity toward the Ambalat dispute with Malaysia, the 
South China Sea issue is not as sensitive to Indonesian public. It is true that after 
reformation, the Indonesian public is becoming more sensitive to territorial disputes. 
However, the absence of historical enmity and past rhetoric with regard to China 
decreases the tendency for the Indonesian public to become emotional.  
Indeed, the Indonesian media tried to fire up Indonesian nationalism once again in 
response to China’s aggressive behavior, as it did during the Ambalat crisis, but the result 
was totally different. Many Indonesian media put the South China Sea dispute with China 
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on their front pages using provocative tones.142 However, since there is no history of an 
enduring rivalry between both countries, there was almost no public reaction. In contrast, 
when the dispute with Malaysia escalated, the public easily reacted. In the South China 
Sea incident, there was no related historical content that Indonesian politicians could use 
as they could with Malaysia during the Ambalat crisis. There is no confrontational policy 
regarding China from the past. Soekarno was even very close to China. During the 
Soeharto era, even though Indonesia cut diplomatic relations with China, there was no 
rhetoric which Soeharto’s administration built that could generate significant anti-PRC 
feelings in Indonesia. Likewise, there is nothing about China that undermines Indonesian 






                                                 
142 Some of the examples are: China Ajak Perang Indonesia di Perairan Natuna or China challenges 
Indonesia for war on Natuna Sea, by Sindonews. See: Rico Afrido Simanjuntak. “China Ajak Perang 
Indonesia di Perairan Natuna [China Challenges Indonesia for War on Natuna Sea].” SINDOnews.com, 
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IV. CURRENT TRENDS: CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY 
TOWARD INDONESIA 
A. OVERVIEW 
Since Chinese President and General Secretary of the CCP Xi Jinping assumed 
power in 2013, China has been marked by a more assertive and nationalistic policy. On 
the other hand, to bring about his “China Dream” slogan,143 Beijing realizes that peace 
and a stable environment in the East Asia region is most important. The South China Sea 
issue is one of the biggest potential threats to regional stability, if Chinese leadership is 
not careful.  
Different from other South East Asian countries involved in the South China Sea 
dispute, Indonesia is not a claimant state. As a result, the possibility of conflict between 
Indonesia and the PRC should be lower than the possibility of conflict between China and 
claimant states such as Vietnam, the Philippines, or even Malaysia. Indonesia and China 
only have a dispute regarding Indonesia’s EEZ, which overlaps with China’s Nine-Dash 
Line claim. By considering this logic, China’s foreign policy would likely have a more 
dovish approach toward Indonesia than it would with claimant states.  
However, as the most populous country in Southeast Asia, Indonesia could be 
harder for China to persuade. The incidents of Chinese fishing vessels arrested by 
Indonesian authorities are not unusual. Even if Indonesia dares to sink one of those 
fishing vesselsa bold measure that arguably will never be taken by other countries in 
Southeast Asiasuch a provocative action would likely serve to rouse Chinese public 
anger, which eventually would bring about a more hawkish foreign policy toward 
Indonesia.  
Based on the preceding considerations, it is necessary to analyze Chinese foreign 
policy toward Indonesia, particularly regarding the South China Sea issue. This chapter 
                                                 
143 The most important aspect of the concept of the China Dream is the goal to achieve a moderately 
well-off society by 2021, the first centenary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, and by 2049, 
the first centenary of the founding of the PRC, to become a fully developed country. See: “Xi Jinping’s 
Chinese Dream,” New York Times, June 4, 2013, accessed August 27, 2017, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
06/05/opinion/global/xi-jinpings-chinese-dream.html.  
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identifies China’s foreign policy toward Indonesia by looking at not only the current 
leader’s motives, but also any obstacles shaping those policies. Separating the Chinese 
key actors with their respective interests is also needed to make a deep analysis regarding 
Chinese foreign policy. 
This chapter reveals that China is tempted to use the South China Sea dispute with 
its Southeast Asian neighbors, including Indonesia, as a stick, while at the same time, 
using the One Belt, One Road or OBOR initiative as a carrot. Because of the importance 
for Xi Jinping’s administration to achieve its first centenary goal in 2021, by multiplying 
the number of middle class citizens in China, Xi Jinping’s administration tends to 
maintain the status quo on the South China Sea issue. This stance preserves the option to 
stay open, and leave it to the next generation to solve.  
B. CHINESE VIEW OF INDONESIA 
As a developing medium-power state, Indonesia is not vitally important to China. 
It is fair to say that China sees Indonesia only as one of many other states in Southeast 
Asia. Nevertheless, some factors undoubtedly make Indonesia somewhat special in 
comparison to its counterparts in Southeast Asia, in China’s view. For instance, Indonesia 
has an important role in driving the course of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ 
(ASEAN), and its economy is relatively independent from China.144 Moreover, Indonesia 
occupies an important geographic location through which almost all of China’s energy 
supplies and trade pass.145 Indonesia also boasts relatively vast territories and a huge 
population.146  
                                                 
144 The trend of the trade between both states in recent years has always been in favor of China. See: 
Angelina Sawitri, “Neraca Perdagangan RI-Cina Defisit, Pemerintah Cari Solusi [The Trade Balance of 
Indonesia-China in Deficit Condition, the Government Seeks for Solution],” Tempo News, accessed August 
27, 2017, https://m.tempo.co/read/news/2016/05/09/090769374/neraca-perdagangan-ri-cina-defisit-
pemerintah-cari-solusi.  
145 Ian Storey, “China’s “Malacca Dilemma,” Jamestown, April 12, 2006, accessed August 27, 2017, 
https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-malacca-dilemma/.  
146 A large percentage of the Indonesian population is a potential market for the Chinese product. The 
Chinese industrialization will undoubtedly need a huge market. A relatively near distance from China, 
Indonesia is considered one of China’s potential markets. 
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On the other hand, even though not as important, some other factors could 
undermine the Chinese view of Indonesia. Historically speaking, the relations between 
the two countries have not always been good. Indonesia’s discontinuation of diplomatic 
relations after alleging China was behind a failed communist coup in 1965147 made 
China lose face. Furthermore, international isolation,148 the prosecution and 
discrimination of Han Chinese in Indonesia,149 the coming of Indonesian Chinese 
refugees,150 and a sense of betrayal, to some extent formed how China sees Indonesia 
today. These memories were exacerbated with several anti-Han Chinese-Indonesian riots 
in the near past.151  
However, it turns out that Indonesia always has a special place in China’s heart. 
During the Asian economic crisis of 1997, for example, China sincerely helped Indonesia 
by not devaluating its currency, providing some loans, and assisting Indonesia to get out 
from the crisis.152  
C. THE NATURE OF THE DISPUTE FOR THE XI ADMINISTRATION 
The South China Sea issue is not a priority for the current Chinese government, or 
even in the previous administrations’ agendas.153 As an issue with a relatively low degree 
of sensitivity, compared to the Taiwan issue, China-Japan relations, or China-United 
States relations, the South China Sea issue represents a low risk card, and in the past 
                                                 
147 John Pike, “Military,” Indonesia Foreign Relations – China, accessed August 27, 2017, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/indonesia/forrel-prc.htm.  
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149 Leo Suryadinata, “Ethnic Chinese in contemporary Indonesia” (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2009), 28. 
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153 The Chinese government has some degree of ambiguity regarding the core interest. The South 
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“Stirring up the South China Sea (I),” Crisis Group, August 9, 2016, accessed August 27, 2017, 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/south-china-sea/stirring-south-china-sea-i.  
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Chinese leaders could play that card as a political commodity.154 Unfortunately, this is 
not necessarily the case today. Because of the increasing of the sensitivity of the Chinese 
public toward the South China Sea problem, and its potential as a damaging factor for the 
current administration’s OBOR Initiative, capitalizing on the issue is now a high-risk 
strategy. As a state in which its public has a high degree of nationalism, the current 
administration has to be careful to carve out its policy regarding the dispute in the South 
China Sea.  
After the ruling of the ITLOS in 2013, it became evident that the Chinese 
government seemed to realize its mistake. The public anger caused by the ITLOS verdict, 
which rejected the Chinese claim to the South China Sea with its Nine-Dash Line 
marking the historical claim, overwhelmed the Chinese government. Even though the 
Chinese public reaction was limited to social media, without any real movement or rally, 
the issue sparked a huge nationalist response at the grassroots level in China.155  
Although not a claimant state in the South China Sea dispute, Indonesia is at odds 
with China regarding its EEZ, which overlaps with the Chinese Nine-Dash Line historical 
claim. China’s ambiguity and the lack of clarity regarding the Nine-Dash Line give China 
a high degree of flexibility. However, as times goes by, it is likely that China will lose 
this flexibility. The Chinese public perception of who owns the South China Sea will 
need to be settled. The “incident” of the Chinese passport, and other previous 
administrations’ actions could make the Chinese public, especially the youth, just take it 
for granted that the whole of South China Sea belongs to China.156  
                                                 
154 Pornomo Yoga, “The Coward Authoritarian and the South China Sea” (unpublished research 
paper for Survey of Asian Politics, September 2017). 
155 Xi Luo, “The South China Sea Case and China’s New Nationalism,” Diplomat, July 19, 2016, 
accessed August 12, 2017, http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/the-south-china-sea-case-and-chinas-new-
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156 Yoga, “The Coward Authoritarian and the South China Sea.” 
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D. KEY PLAYERS AND INTERESTS 
Even though many analysts believe that President Xi is a strong leader, the 
Chinese government today, is not a monolithic administration anymore.157 The 
assumption that the Chinese government runs with a top-down command only fit during 
Mao Zedong’s totalitarian era. Just as in other states, some key players and interests 
contribute to shaping Chinese foreign policy toward its South China Sea dispute with 
Indonesia.  
The People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) plays quite a significant role in 
shaping Chinese foreign policy regarding the South China Sea dispute. The statements of 
military officers and the actions of the military in the field can be seen as parts of Chinese 
foreign policy. However, President Xi’s strong control of the military,158 and his anti-
corruption campaign,159 could reduce the PLA’s involvement. Moreover, China never 
sent the PLA Navy to handle its maritime dispute with Indonesia.160  
The Chinese Coast Guard, a newly formed institution under the State Oceanic 
Administration, has gained more influence in recent years.161 The Chinese government 
formed this new desk mainly because so many different institutions, without any clear 
                                                 
157 In the post-Tiananmen incident, Deng Xiaoping tried to introduce some checks and balances in the 
government to prevent one single leader from holding so much power. For an explanation about Xi Jinping 
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Military.” 
160 There have been several incidents between the two countries, but never involving the PLA Navy, 
even though Indonesia was using the navy to deal with the dispute. 
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command and coordination, stirred up the situation in the South China Sea.162 The 
Chinese Coast Guard replaces the military to assert China’s claim in the South China 
Sea.163 Formed from four separated institutions in 2013, the Chinese Coast Guard has 
become the biggest coast guard in the region.164 As a new player, the organization would 
likely seek recognition for its new role in guarding Chinese sovereignty and sovereign 
right in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, the use of the coast guard, instead of the navy, 
in conducting patrols in the South China Sea, could be considered as a signal to a foreign 
audience that China does not want to increase tensions in the disputed area.165 
E. STRATEGY FOR THE DOMESTIC AUDIENCE: GAINING ROOM TO 
MANEUVER 
Many analysts view Xi Jinping’s foreign policy as much more hawkish than that 
of his predecessor. After he stepped into power in 2013, several heavy-handed foreign 
policies have been made. Some examples of President Xi’s assertive posture include the 
enforcement of the Air Defense Identification Zone, or ADIZ, in the East China Sea; a 
staunchly strict attitude regarding the North Korean missile program; and several decisive 
actions in the South China Sea.166 In the South China Sea dispute, we can observe his 
assertiveness, for example, in his rejection of the ITLOS verdict in 2013, the reclamations 
of several features in the disputed area in the South China Sea, and in several standoffs 
between the Chinese government’s vessels and its Southeast Asian neighbors’ vessels. 
However, as time passes, China is becoming more dovish toward its Southeast Asian 
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neighbors. This approach is needed to provide a sense of safety among Southeast Asian 
countries. In May 2015, the Chinese government suddenly seemed to abandon its 
assertiveness regarding the South China Sea dispute, by announcing the cessation of 
features reclamations.167 President Xi’s peripheral diplomacy also puts aside the South 
China Sea dispute in order for China to make its One Belt, One Road initiative become a 
reality; this shift enables Beijing to ensure the stability of the region and maintain China’s 
economic growth to achieve its first centenary target. Some argue that this is actually an 
unpredicted for Xi Jinping to choose between two options.168 But, if we look more 
closely, we can see this as a deliberate effort by President Xi to gain sympathy from the 
domestic audience first, in order to maintain freedom of action in the future. 
Xi Jinping does not want to be seen as a weak leader by the Chinese public. A 
weak statement by Chinese leaders in front of foreign leaders when they engage on the 
dispute in the South China Sea would be intolerable. However, as a politician, President 
Xi knows that he has to bargain to achieve his goal, or at least pay lip service to easing 
the tension in the South China Sea, in order to give a sense of security to the Southeast 
Asian countries. What matters is not the sincerity of the Chinese leader’s statement 
regarding the halting of Chinese reclamation,169 but the impact of that statement on the 
Chinese public. 
As a successor of Hu Jintao, President Xi must appear to his domestic audience, at 
a minimum, no less patriotic than his predecessor. Hu Jintao’s tenure was marked by 
Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. Many incidents happened in Hu’s 
administration, and tensions heightened in the South China Sea due to his bold stand to 
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include the South China Sea issue as one of the Chinese core interests.170 Because of Hu 
Jintao’s policy legacy regarding the South China Sea, President Xi was under pressure at 
the beginning of his time in office to continue his predecessor’s policy.  
Chinese assertiveness at the beginning of Xi Jinping’s tenure could then be 
interpreted as an effort to gain extra room for maneuvering. Before he could abandon the 
South China Sea problem, he had to prove his hawkishness to the Chinese public. 
President Xi has to convince the domestic audiences that China has already gotten 
enough from the South China Sea dispute. The Philippines’ and Vietnam’s 
bandwagoning with China,171 was one of the biggest political commodities that the 
Chinese government could sell to its domestic audiences. Having dealt with these two 
countries, Xi Jinping now has arguably, some greater freedom of action. 
Unfortunately, when dealing with Indonesia, this is not the case. Indonesia’s 
strong stance trapped the Chinese government in a dilemma. After the shooting of 
Chinese fishing vessels by the Indonesian authorities,172 Chinese nationalist netizens 
began to react, and demanded that their government do more to protect the interest of 
their country.173 On the Indonesian side, the Indonesian government did not want to back 
down on the situation. To solve this dilemma, the Chinese government tried to lure its 
Indonesian counterpart by using a “special lane” through back channels to discuss 
problem solving, rather than using public provocative statements.174 
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F. STRATEGY FOR FOREIGN GOVERNMENT AUDIENCES: CARROT 
AND STICK FOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES 
The forcefulness of the Chinese claim regarding its Nine-Dash Line has not led 
China to publish its assertion clearly.175 To date, China has never provided the exact 
coordinates of the Nine-Dash Line. Because of this, China still has control over its 
course of action, and in determining whether to heighten its tensions with Indonesia, or 
ease them. In the most recent statement made by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in response to the dispute between the two countries, the spokeswoman 
provided no details except to say that China has a natural resources dispute with 
Indonesia.176 Similarly, China remains vague over the status of its claim. Although the 
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated that the dispute was only a matter of 
natural resources, Beijing sent Chinese government vessels to patrol within all the areas 
covered by Nine-Dash Line, signalling that China wants to uphold its jurisdiction.177 
There is still no clear-cut explanation as to whether the status of waters within the Nine-
Dash Line, including the area overlapping Indonesia’s EEZ, is a territorial waters or 
merely an EEZ. In the meantime, China is trying to keep all possible options open. One 
of the best and lowest risk actions is using a fishing vessel armada. The Chinese 
Government has intensified its fishing vessel armada, as evidenced by the 
encouragement in 2013 from Chinese President Xi, who said that Chinese fishermen 
should stake their claims around the disputed area.178 
At the same time, the OBOR initiative parallels the Indonesian administration’s 
priority of building infrastructure. President Joko Widodo (often referred to as Jokowi) 
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has a new slogan to make Indonesia the world’s maritime fulcrum, which inevitably 
demands a huge amount of money for the Indonesian government to build many ports, 
roads, and other infrastructure to lower logistics costs throughout Indonesia. 
Unfortunately, the government cannot reach the goal by simply relying on the national 
budget. Despite the fact that the Jokowi administration has tried mightily to collect the 
funds, for example by promulgating tax amnesty, budget tightening, and bureaucratic 
savings, Indonesia still lacks resources to make its goal come true. The OBOR initiative 
is one of the best alternatives that Jakarta has. In Jakarta’s view (at the beginning), 
OBOR is an economic incentive. Like a carrot, it could be given if Indonesia became 
cooperative with China, including on the South China Sea issue. The enthusiasm of 
other Southeast Asian countries179 might make this carrot even more attractive.  
Using the South China Sea dispute as a stick and the OBOR initiative as a carrot 
to induce Indonesia to follow the Xi administration’s priorities presents difficulties. 
Unlike the Philippines and Vietnam, which adopted a bandwagoning strategy with 
China180 after being beaten by Chinese sticks and fed with Chinese carrots, Indonesia is 
steadfastly maintaining its position. As a country that just experienced some 
disruptions, by losing East Timor,181 losing the Sipadan and Ligitan islands,182 and 
suffering insurgencies in Aceh province and Papua Island, Indonesia sees maritime 
disputes as a sensitive issue for the Indonesian public. The most recent occurrence, the 
Ambalat case, a dispute over the EEZ with Malaysia, ignited anger and huge protests at 
the grassroots level of Indonesian society.183 This experience makes it difficult for the 
current Indonesian government to back down in facing its EEZ dispute with China. The 
low risk associated with President Xi’s strategy of using an armada of Chinese fishing 
                                                 
179 Many countries seemed enthusiastic at the beginning. See: Zhang Yunling, “One Belt, One Road.” 
Global Asia 10, no. 3 (2015): 8–12. 
180 Bandwagoning strategy: A term that is commonly used in international relations. It refers to a 
strategy where a weaker state makes an alliance with the stronger state, instead of trying to balance it. See: 
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: WW Norton, 2001), 162–164. 
181 In 1999, East Timor became independent after the referendum. 
182 In December 2002, based on an ICJ ruling, both islands became part of Malaysia. 
183 Kompas Cyber Media, “Nasionalisme dan Ambalat Halaman,” Kompas, accessed August 27, 
2017, http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2015/07/31/15060001/Nasionalisme.dan.Ambalat.  
 57 
vessels also seems doomed to failure. The current Indonesian government aggressively 
seeks to wipe out illegal fishing, rendering this armada largely ineffective. Many times, 
following the capture of Chinese fishing vessels by Indonesian authorities, the 
Indonesian government has asserted its sovereign right over the disputed area.184 The 
initial plan to use the OBOR initiative as a carrot has also failed to get the expected 
result thus far. Jakarta seems quite aware of not overindulging in Chinese incentives. 
For now, Indonesia has only accepted a relatively small amount of money from China, 
compared to other countries, such as Malaysia or Pakistan.185 
G. CONCLUSION 
Xi Jinping’s ten-year tenure makes him think pragmatically. Bickering with his 
southern neighbors, including Indonesia, the biggest country in Southeast Asia, for the 
sake of a maritime dispute is not a priority, especially in light of the international 
community’s resistance to the Chinese rejection of the ITLOS verdict in 2013. 
However, in order to gain the Chinese public’s trust and credibility on foreign policy 
matters, before setting aside the South China Sea problem, President Xi had to make 
some assertive actions in his early period of office. After the reputation for hawkishness 
was attached to the current administration, Beijing then tried to persuasively induce 
Indonesia to join aspects of the Chinese project, in order to pursue joint development, at 
the expense of setting aside the maritime dispute in the north off the Natuna Islands. It 
therefore seems that the trend of China’s assertiveness will be decreasing in the coming 
years. 
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V. CURRENT TRENDS: INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
TOWARD CHINA 
A. OVERVIEW 
Many different statements from Indonesian officials regarding the South China 
Sea issue, without question, contradict each other. Each cabinet member who feels an 
authority regarding the South China Sea issue can freely make public statements. At 
times President Jokowi’s administration has seemed strict about curbing China’s 
assertiveness. For example, several days after China’s Coast Guard tried to impede the 
Indonesian Navy Ship, KRI Imam Bonjol-383 in June 2016, the Indonesian minister of 
maritime affairs and fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti, held a press conference to state that 
Indonesia would proceed with its law enforcement process by capturing all vessels that 
had conducted illegal fishing activities, including China’s vessels.186 She also praised the 
Indonesian Navy for acting based on the standard operating procedure, by shooting at 
China’s fishing vessel, which had been caught in the act of conducting illegal fishing 
within the Indonesian EEZ.187 In contrast, several days later, Indonesian Vice President 
Jusuf Kalla seemed to downplay the dispute between the states and remarked that 
Indonesia would not send a diplomatic protest to China.188 
Indonesia’s behavioral signals regarding the South China Sea issue have been 
ambiguous as well. For instance, on the one hand, the Indonesian military buildup and the 
conduct of military exercises in Natuna seemed to be a strong signal to China about 
Indonesia’s power balancing strategy. On the other hand, Indonesia’s decision to abort 
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the sinking of Chinese fishing vessels caught by Indonesian authorities189 showed a 
compromise in Indonesia’s strategy toward China. All of these mixed signals showed that 
Indonesia embraces a “sitting on the fence, while drawing the red lines” strategy 
regarding the South China Sea dispute. Before we dive deeply into the reasons for 
Indonesia to adhere to this policy, it is important to understand the nature of the dispute 
itself for the Indonesian government, apart from the perspective of the Indonesian public 
or other domestic actors. After that, we dissect the internal factors and external situations 
that cause Indonesia to adopt this strategy regarding the South China Sea dispute. 
B. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM FOR THE INDONESIAN 
GOVERNMENT 
Legally speaking, the lack of clarity of China’s Nine-Dash Line makes the 
overlapping claim obscure. Such confusion regarding China’s controversial Nine-Dash 
Lines190 means the Indonesian government cannot take a firm stand on addressing this 
issue. Two possible issues emerge regarding the dispute between China and Indonesia: 
the sovereignty issue and the sovereign rights issue. The sovereignty issue presents itself 
if China’s Nine-Dash Line overlaps the Natuna islands or overlaps Indonesian territorial 
waters off the Natuna islands.191 The sovereign rights issue presents itself if China’s 
Nine-Dash Line overlaps the Indonesian EEZ. Based on the UNCLOS of 1982, the state 
only has sovereign rights over the EEZ, the right to harnessing its natural resources, and a 
jurisdiction to prevent other states from possessing the same right. Thus, while many of 
Indonesia’s neighbors have a “real territorial dispute” over island, reef, rock, low tide 
elevation, or even territorial waters, Indonesia only has a potential dispute over maritime 
economic resources.  
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C. THE PROBLEM FROM THE INDONESIAN PUBLIC’S PERSPECTIVE 
Historically, the Indonesian government during the Soeharto era has had 
complicated relations with China. Two and a half decades of friendly relations is 
arguably not sufficient to erase all memories of the New Order indoctrinations about the 
“China Problem” or “masalah cina.”192 Even though there was no rhetoric that could 
glorify public nationalism as Soekarno did toward Malaysia, the Indonesian government 
in the New Order era still portrayed China as a threat. The New Order had a creed of 
triple Chinese threats: communism, Indonesian Chinese, and Beijing.193 Even though 
bilateral relations resumed in 1990, and Beijing had shown itself as a true friend during 
the economic crisis in 1998, it is likely that remnants of the New Order indoctrination 
remained in the minds of many Indonesian people, including the elites. Many still feel 
skeptical about the sincerity of China’s intentions. The current tie between the two 
countries is also undermined by the presence of a large number of Chinese workers in 
Indonesia. The Indonesian public views this as proof of the government’s partiality.194 
The government is regarded as favoring China’s interests and failing to protect its local 
workers.195 The South China Sea dispute with China therefore certainly has the potential 
to recall an old memory of China as a threat to Indonesia.  
After the fall of the New Order regime in 1998, Indonesia faced the possibility of 
state disintegration. East Timor became independent in 1999. Several separatist 
movements emerged in many Indonesian regions, and in 2002, the IJC ruled that Sipadan 
and Ligitan islands belong to Malaysia. Since then, Indonesia has become more sensitive 
over the issue of territorial integrity. Furthermore, after the ruling on Sipadan and Ligitan 
islands, a new problem showed up: the Ambalat dispute with Malaysia. Even though the 
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Ambalat dispute was not a dispute over populated territories, but only a matter of an 
EEZ, the Indonesian public reaction was overwhelming. Many politicians and public 
figures demanded that the government take firm action, including the use military forces.  
D. INDONESIAN PRIORITIES UNDER PRESIDENT JOKOWI  
The development of maritime infrastructure to achieve high economic growth is 
undoubtedly among the top priorities of President Jokowi’s administration. By stating its 
strategy as a world maritime axis or “poros maritim dunia,” the Indonesian government 
plans to build many ports, roads, and other infrastructures to lower the logistics costs 
throughout Indonesia. Unfortunately, the government cannot reach the goal by simply 
relying on the national budget. China, at the same period, tried to invest in many 
countries, including in Southeast Asian countries. With its investment diversification 
programthe OneBelt, One Road projectand the newly established Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), China could become a promising source of 
funding. The economic crisis in 1998 opened Indonesia’s eyes. In the harsh economic 
situation, Indonesia learned who its real friend was. At a moment when Indonesia felt left 
out by many Western countries, including Japan, China provided critical monetary 
assistance, increasing the attractiveness of an economic bandwagoning strategy.  
E. KEY ACTORS AND INTERESTS 
Several significant actors, institutions, and interests shape Indonesian foreign 
policy regarding the South China Sea maritime dispute with China. To make it easier to 
analyze, it is wise to separate them into three categories: the dovish policy proponent, the 
hawkish policy proponent, and the balancer. 
The supporters of the dovish policy are key actors or institutions who encourage a 
soft approach toward China regarding the maritime dispute. Among them are Vice 
President Jusuf Kalla and Megawati Soekarnoputri. In March 2016, several days after the 
Chinese Coast Guard incident, Vice President Kalla went to China to attend the Boao 
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forum for the Asia Annual Conference.196 His trip invited a negative reaction from the 
Indonesian House of Representatives.197 The vice president even was at odds with Susi 
Pudjiastuti, the minister of fisheries and maritime affairs, regarding her regulation about 
the moratorium on illegal fishing by foreign vessels, issued several days after the Chinese 
Coast Guard incident.198 In June 2016, Vice President Kalla made a statement regarding 
the South China Sea issue with China. During the interview, it seemed that he was 
downplaying the conflict by saying that the state did not need to send a diplomatic protest 
to the Chinese government regarding the arrest of Chinese fisherman who got caught red-
handed while poaching in Indonesian waters.199 Likewise, the relationship between 
Megawati (and her party, the PDIP) and the Chinese government is also close. In 2015, 
Megawati even went to China to inaugurate the “home of Sukarno” or “rumah Soekarno” 
in Shenzhen.200 Then, she met with Chinese Communist Party leaders.201 Several days 
later, she had a courtesy visit with Chinese President Xi in Beijing to discuss good 
relations between the two countries.202 As a PDIP party leader (the party to which 
President Joko Widodo belongs), her influence on Indonesia’s foreign policy regarding 
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the South China Sea issue is unclear, but it would certainly affect Indonesia’s relations 
with China, including the South China Sea maritime dispute. 
The supporters of the hawkish policy are key actors or institutions who encourage 
a firmer approach toward China regarding the maritime dispute. Among them are Susi 
Pudjiastuti and the military. The minister of maritime affairs and fisheries, Susi 
Pudjiastuti is an eccentric, dedicated businesswoman, who almost always takes assertive 
actions toward China. Her indiscriminate program to blow up all foreign fishing 
vesselsincluding China’s caught red-handed while conducting illegal fishing in 
Indonesian waters often invites controversy. As a businesswoman who came from a 
fisherman’s family she has an aim to increase Indonesia’s fisheries exports and to elevate 
the standard of living of Indonesian fisherman. Likewise, the Indonesian military, 
including Chief of Staff General Gatot Nurmantyo, and Minister of Defense General (ret) 
Ryamizard Ryachudu, also want to show some firmness with China. Even though they 
disagree about many other things, they coincidentally have the same thoughts about the 
perception of threat. They believe in a conspiracy theory and a proxy war theory, which 
suspect that the major powers have an ill intention toward Indonesia.203 The military as 
an institution also believes in the New Order paradigm about the latent threat of 
communism as an ideology. China, as a state that allegedly supported the Indonesian 
Communist Party or Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) during the attempted coup in 1965, 
certainly must be handled with caution in their view. Such thinking certainly influences 
their reactions to the dispute over the EEZ in the South China Sea. One prominent 
example, military exercises, which are usually conducted alternately in various regions 
across Indonesia, now are always being carried out in the Natuna region.  
The balancer is the one who is in the middle between the two extreme ends of the 
spectrum. This group tends to respond to the dispute diplomatically. Two prominent 
actors in this group are Luhut Binsar Panjaitan and Retno Marsudi. Luhut, a former 
general and businessman who has much experience in diplomacy. His pragmatic 
                                                 




approach makes sound Indonesian foreign policy.204 Retno Marsudi, a career diplomat, 
could provide the president with good advice. Together with Luhut, Retno assists 
President Widodo in international affairs. 
F. THE STRATEGY OF SITTING ON THE FENCE  
The Indonesian government tries to balance the South China Sea dispute with its 
need for China’s investment in Indonesia. The reversal by the president of the 
Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte, has added a new dynamic to the situation. His 
unprecedented action to align the Philippines with China has raised concerns about 
sparking a new trend among Southeast Asian countries.205 The implications for Indonesia 
of President Duterte’s action are twofold. First, by giving up its resistance, the 
Philippines allows China to reduce its provision of “carrots” for Southeast Asian 
countries, since China does not need as much support as before. Second, the Philippines 
would likely receive more “carrots” from China. This of course, reflects China’s effort to 
provide an incentive to a compliant country in Southeast Asia. For example, in November 
2016, China invested 24 billion dollars in a Philippines’ infrastructure project.206  
China’s OBOR project, indeed, sets a current trend in tSoutheast Asia. The mega-
project of OBOR with its enormous source of funding makes Southeast Asian states, 
including the claimant states in the South China Sea dispute, interested in gaining from it. 
Malaysia, for example, as early as September 2016, tried to push aside the South China 
Sea issue for the sake of its future potential economic gain.207 Vietnam, a country among 
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the hardliners in the South China Sea issue also showed interest in joining China’s OBOR 
program.208  
After the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling came out in July 2016, Indonesia 
seemed to hesitate to be the one to act first. After several neighbors made statements 
regarding the issue, Indonesia took a more moderate stand than that of its neighbors.209 In 
contrast, during the administration of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Indonesia almost 
always took the initiative in the ASEAN forum.210 Minister of Foreign Affairs Marty 
Natalegawa never hesitated to take the initiative, including in regard to the South China 
Sea issue.211 By juxtaposing these two different characters of the administrations, it is 
safe to say that President Joko Widodo’s strategy of “sitting on the fence” makes 
Indonesia more dovish than that of his predecessor. Another example is the regulation to 
sink an illegal fishing vessel. Although Indonesian officials always say that they would 
blow up all illegal fishing vessels without considering their nationality, including Chinese 
vessels,212 in practice, until April 2017, of the 317 vessels that had already been sunk, 
only one vessel was Chinese.213 This shows that the Indonesian government treats 
Chinese vessels differently from fishing vessels from other countries, such as Vietnam, 
Thailand, or Malaysia, providing further evidence of the Jokowi administration’s dovish 
approach toward China. 
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G. DRAWING “RED LINES” 
Even though Indonesia tries to “sit on the fence,” the Indonesian government 
under President Widodo tries also to take into account the South China Sea dispute and 
the need for China’s investment in Indonesian maritime projects, by creating two “red 
lines”: limiting China from stepping in, and limiting Indonesia from stepping out.  
The lack of coordination and the different interests of Indonesian government 
officials are reflected in the statements they have given concerning the issue. However, it 
may be that to some degree these uncoordinated behaviors are beneficial for Indonesia as 
a whole. The Indonesian government in some ways can leverage its domestic situation to 
draw a “red line” with China. For instance, after the arrest of Chinese fishing vessels by 
the Indonesian Navy in March 2016, the Indonesian government, represented by Foreign 
Minister Retno Marsudi, made a firm statement protesting the violation of territorial 
waters by the Chinese Coast Guard. The protest could easily be made without any moral 
backlash after the harsh statement and the consideration to bring the case to the 
international court from Susi Pujiastuti, the fisheries and maritime affairs minister.214 
Even though everyone knew that Susi did not have the capacity to take the incident to the 
international legal arena, it is clear that by making her statement, she was trying to make 
the case a more sensitive issue for the Indonesian public. In China’s view, the Indonesian 
government could be seen as having no other choice but to send a diplomatic protest to 
appease the Indonesian public. The Indonesian government hoped that by viewing this as 
a threshold, China’s government could understand the “red line” that China cannot cross 
regarding the dispute in the north of Natuna. 
Since the previously described case was not the only one, nor even the last one, 
the Indonesian government has seemed to somehow tolerate this incongruity, as long as it 
remained within a controllable spectrum. However, once it seemed that it would 
undermine the relations between Indonesia and China, the government tried to intervene 
with its domestic actors. For example, when Susi Pudjiastuti wanted to blow up the 
                                                 
214 “Menteri Susi Ancam Membawa Cina ke Mahkamah Internasional [Minister Susi Threatens to 
Bring China to the International Court],” BBC Indonesia, March 21, 2016, accessed June 3, 2017, 
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Chinese fishing vessels, the government stepped in and tried to stop her action,215 since 
destroying the vessels would jeopardize relations between the two countries, and 
eventually affect China’s investment in President Jokowi’s maritime infrastructure 
projects. By exercising this control, the Indonesian government also drew a “red line” 
that it, too, could not overstep. This would be necessary to achieve its short-term goal, 
which is for Indonesia to become a global maritime fulcrum.  
H. CONCLUSION 
Even though it is too early to predict, there is a strong possibility that Indonesia 
will cross its own “red line” in the near future. This is due to the fact that Indonesia’s 
enthusiasm for OBOR seems to be decreasing.216 The Jakarta-Bandung high-speed rail, a 
pilot project for the OBOR initiative, has generated many critiques not only from the 
Indonesian public, but also from various institutions within the government.217 Recent 
skepticism from many countries regarding the OBOR initiative,218 also likely makes 
Indonesia more aware of its own cost-benefit calculation regarding the OBOR initiative. 
If Indonesia’s dependency on the OBOR project decreases over time, the Indonesian 
government will be less dependent on the Chinese government’s financial support. This 
could alter interactions among key actors and institutions within Indonesia’s internal 
politics. While the dovish and hawkish actors will tend to be constant, under these 
circumstances the balancer actors might be more inclined to slacken their grip on the 
hawkish actors. With more freedom of action, Indonesia could become more assertive in 
its dispute with China. The current example of this assertiveness is the renaming of the 
area north of the Natuna islands to be called “Laut Natuna Utara” or “North Natuna Sea” 
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in July 2017,219 which marked a stauncher gesture of the Indonesian government 
regarding the South China Sea issue.220  
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VI. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
From the historical analysis in the preceding chapters, we can draw two main 
conclusions. First, China and Indonesia would not be motivated to engage in military 
action over the disputed area merely for the intrinsic value of the area. Second, China and 
Indonesia would most likely to go to war as a response to China’s domestic politics, as 
happened during Sino-Soviet war. Even though the Chinese government today is not the 
same as the Chinese government in the 1960s, the concern about domestic politics and 
sustaining regime authority is much the same. In Chapter IV, we saw that domestic 
pressure within China greatly influenced Beijing’s response to the South China Sea 
problem. The high level of nationalism regarding the South China Sea dispute may 
eventually force the Chinese government to take assertive action. This trend has been 
increasing without any significant effort from the government to ease public tension over 
the South China Sea issue. 
Nevertheless, from our historical analysis, we further conclude that the likelihood 
of military escalation between China and Indonesia is low. From the current trend of 
Indonesia’s foreign policy toward China, we find that Indonesia is positioned to increase 
its hawkishness in dealing with the maritime dispute with China. However, it will not 
significantly influence the conflict escalation. If there was a strong public demand within 
Indonesia to use military power to deal with a maritime dispute, our evidence indicates 
that the Indonesian government would only show its muscle to the degree that it becomes 
satisfactory to appease its domestic audience. Moreover, our evidence also shows that the 
Indonesian public would be much more likely to demand the use of military might in 
response to an enduring Indonesian rival, such as Malaysia, than it would be toward 
China. Lastly, from the current trend of Chinese foreign policy toward Indonesia, the 
evidences show that the Chinese government is inclined to decrease its assertiveness in 
the South China Sea, since it needs Indonesia’s cooperation on the OBOR initiative. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDONESIA 
Even though the possibility of conflict escalation is low, it is still important to 
give recommendations for the Indonesian government in order to keep the risk of 
escalation low. Therefore, we propose several recommendations for the Indonesian 
government in order to minimize the possibility of armed conflict with China regarding 
the South China Sea issue. 
1. Be Aware of the Chinese Government’s Weakness in Dealing with its 
Own Domestic Audience 
The Indonesian government should realize that it is not easy for the Chinese 
government to control the behavior of its public regarding the issue of the South China 
Sea. As a result, the tendency for the Chinese government to use the South China Sea 
issue to rally citizens ′round the flag is likely to continue. Knowing this, the Indonesian 
government can try to put itself in the Chinese government’s shoes and predict the 
consequences before making policies regarding the South China Sea dispute. 
2. Do Not Expect China to Obey the Law of the Sea 
It is unrealistic to expect the Chinese public to understand the Law of the Sea. As 
the second largest superpower with 1.3 billion people, China, as a whole, has its own 
understanding about who owns the South China Sea, including the disputed area with 
Indonesia. Since it is not likely there will be any effort from the Chinese government to 
educate its public about the Law of the Sea in the short term, it is better to understand, 
how the Chinese public perceives the situation. By having this understanding, the 
Indonesian government can prudently carve its foreign policy regarding the South China 
Sea issue. 
3. Do Not Provoke China Publicly 
In general, the Indonesian government may achieve better outcomes by avoiding 
public statements that will easily provoke the Chinese public. Holding press conferences 
or taking actions that can be easily viewed by the Chinese public may reduce the freedom 
of action of the Chinese government and eventually force it to react assertively. 
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Backchannel diplomacy and written rebuttal of Chinese claims, as the Indonesian 
government has always done, are likely to be more effective than actions that provoke the 
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